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ABSTRACT 
 
 This thesis considers film as a unique medium capable of inviting viewers to 
engage in an existential consideration of social, political, ethical, and intellectual 
problems. It addresses the limitations that existing scholarship place on the potentiality 
of film as a medium by arguing that these limitations are often the result of a failure to 
consider film’s essential and self-conscious ability to be critical of its modes of 
production, the industry surrounding it, the ideas it expresses, and the audience that 
consumes it. Considerations from Walter Benjamin and Theodor Adorno contribute to 
the creation of an alternative theoretical perspective, one which identifies film’s critical 
capabilities and lays the groundwork for viewers to engage with and learn from the 
critiques offered by film. Further, this thesis demands renewed scholarly consideration 
of film as an opportunity for viewers to consider the political, social, and intellectual 
issues of their age in an authentic and individual ritual. 
 This thesis demonstrates the advantages of this perspective through formal and 
theoretical readings of Sullivan’s Travels (Sturges 1941), Citizen Kane (Welles 1941), 
and shorter focused readings of connected themes found in A Star is Born (Wellman 
1937), The Bad and the Beautiful (Minnelli 1952), and The Crowd (Vidor 1928). These 
readings draw from established readings in order to elucidate the advantages offered by 
this new theoretical approach to film. Further, this thesis demonstrates the persistence of 
film’s critical capabilities throughout Hollywood history by drawing connections 
between films from the Classical era and Postmodern era. Contemporary films under 
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consideration include Fargo (The Coen Brothers 1996), O Brother Where Art Thou (The 
Coen Brothers 2000), Adaptation (Jonze 2002), Burn After Reading (The Coen Brothers 
2008), and Inception (Nolan 2010). This thesis thus defends the position that film’s 
unique ontological structure consistently enables it to invite viewers to join it in a 
critique of the cultural, economic, political, and social structures from which it arises. 
Further, film satisfies the same pedagogical demands placed on classic works of 
literature and painting, and enables viewers to engage in the work of existential self-
creation so that they can become mature social and political agents. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis takes as its departure a specific perspective of film as an artistic 
medium. Film is and has always been a critical medium: a medium critical of itself, its 
own modes of production, the industry surrounding it, the ideas it expresses, and the 
audience that consumes it. While this idea has been raised by scholars in relation to 
specific films, this thesis endeavors to examine the way in which the ontological status 
of film is one that uniquely primes all films for the opportunity to offer the audience an 
opportunity to engage in social, political, ethical, intellectual, and philosophical critique 
of the world around them. Further, it argues that this opportunity does not simply occur 
in the postmodern era, as theorists such as Linda Hutcheon would argue, but can be 
readily found in the classical era (1917-1969).  
 This thesis employs a number of separate claims in order to build towards this 
overarching argument. In Chapter II, “Reviving Cinephilia,” I offer a detailed 
description of three philosophical approaches to film theory that limit the viewer and 
critics’ ability to engage with film. I discuss two different types of realist approaches to 
film – mimetic realism and romantic realism – and offer critiques on their narrow 
approach to what film is and what it can accomplish. Then, I criticize Walter Benjamin’s 
pessimistic perspective of film as manipulated reality, that is, reality that is always-
already shaped and colored by the capitalist means of production required to create it. 
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Drawing from this analysis, the chapter then considers the way in which these 
philosophical approaches to the study of film have resulted in confining perspectives of 
film from the Classical Hollywood era in particular. This section takes as an example the 
work of David Bordwell, and elucidates several theoretical flaws and resulting 
limitations in his approach to reading classical film as, simply, classical. Finally, the 
chapter concludes with a suggested alternative to these ways of reading film constructed 
from the work of Walter Benjamin. This perspective liberates film from Benjamin’s 
restriction of it as capitalist commodity, and raises it to the level of an individual ritual 
capable of offering an existential engagement with the film itself. This ritual enables 
viewers to engage with the film in a personal, critical, and intellectual manner, opening 
the opportunity to reflect on their personal, political, social, and ethical situation in an 
authentic way.  
In Chapter III, “Film as Critical Pedagogy,” I broaden the discussion by 
considering the placement of film in a larger intellectual, cultural, and educational 
context. I begin with a brief historical consideration of the ways in which film has been 
decried as ethically unsound, intellectually empty, and dangerous for the masses, and 
then connect these early concerns to those voiced by Allan Bloom in his Closing of the 
American Mind. Bloom’s concern that film does not possess classical literature’s ability 
to engage students in existential journeys of self-discovery, cultural awareness, or self-
creation is elucidated with the consideration of another cinephobe, Theodor Adorno. 
Furthering this discussion, I draw in Neil Postman’s critique of television and film from 
his Amusing Ourselves to Death.  
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In the course of the chapter, I argue that Postman’s argument is based on an 
impoverished definition of the image, a theoretical flaw discussed in Chapter II. I also 
argue that film meets Bloom’s criteria of emancipatory and pedagogical literature. 
Further, the pervasiveness of the medium permits students to engage with the kind of 
ideas Bloom wishes to disseminate in arenas outside traditional education, making film a 
prime candidate for students who lack the opportunity – or drive – to engage with ideas 
in the specific manner Bloom has laid out. I conclude the chapter by demonstrating that 
film, understood in this existential sense, does qualify as an aesthetic form under 
Theodor Adorno’s definition. This discussion is aided with analysis of several avant-
garde films from the 1930s. 
In Chapter IV, “Complicitous Critique, a Hollywood Tradition,” I draw together 
the theoretical considerations from the preceding chapters and apply them to the reading 
of several films. Under consideration are two main films, Preston Sturges’ Sullivan’s 
Travels (1941) and Orson Welles’ Citizen Kane (1941). While I read these films with the 
aid of ample scholarly literature, the unique contribution of my readings is a situation of 
these films within my larger ontological argument about the critical and self-conscious 
nature of film as a medium. To augment this analysis, I track themes, leitmotifs, 
technical processes, and narrative conventions through many films from the Classical 
Hollywood era including A Star Is Born (Wellman 1937), The Bad and the Beautiful 
(Minnelli 1952), and The Crowd (Vidor 1928). Further, I explore the tradition of self-
conscious exposition of filmic devices from the Classical era to those more frequently 
celebrated in the postmodern era by integrating readings of Fargo (The Coen Brothers 
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1996), O Brother Where Art Thou (The Coen Brothers 2000), Adaptation (Jonze 2002), 
Burn After Reading (The Coen Brothers 2008), and Inception (Nolan 2010). In this 
analysis, I employ the existential approach to film discussed in Chapter 2 while 
demonstrating the pedagogical, critical, and aesthetic value of film as discussed in 
Chapter III. The result is a chapter that offers extensive demonstration of an ontological, 
formal, and theoretical perspective of film as self-conscious, critical, and capable of 
offering viewers existential engagement. 
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CHAPTER II 
REVIVING CINEPHILIA 
 
Since its inception, film has demanded the attention of philosophers, sociologists, 
psychologists, film theorists, and literature scholars. As a medium uniquely tied to its 
technological modes of production, film is decried by the Critical Theorists as a 
mechanism of capitalism; as a technology capable of capturing, enhancing, and 
manipulating reality, film is hailed by media scholars as an art form capable of bringing 
reality to the viewer for her inspection and contemplation. Still, some previous 
approaches to film theory present myriad difficulties for those wishing to explore the 
contemporary potentialities of the medium. In this chapter, we will explore three 
philosophical approaches to film theory, and elucidate the limitations of each of these 
approaches. We will then consider the way in which these early efforts at characterizing 
film as a medium have influenced some of the scholarship surrounding the Classical 
Hollywood era (1917-1960), and the limitations to this approach. Finally, relying on the 
work of Walter Benjamin, we will explore an approach to film that permits the viewer to 
engage with film in a personal, critical, and intellectual manner, as a work of art capable 
of fulfilling Benjamin’s emancipatory hopes for the medium. 
 
II.1. Theories of Film 
To ask whether film is a unique medium is to ask no real question at all. The 
field of film studies has established the unique nature of film as a medium since its early 
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inception; indeed, the very existence of a field of film studies demands acknowledgment 
that film is a discipline unto itself. Even so, the treatment of film – sometimes within 
film studies, sometimes without – is often marred by the failure to treat film as a unique 
medium. I wish to continue to challenge the assumption that it is appropriate to describe 
film, so distanced in its material, technological, and authorial production from other 
forms of art, as relying on the same formal devices of other forms of art.
1
 As Gotthold 
Lessing argues, reading media as necessarily similar to other media – in his case, poetry 
from the lens of painting or painting from the lens of poetry – results in a profound 
limitation in adequately considering and analyzing the work itself: 
[Critics] pronounce the shallowest judgments with the greatest self-assurance, 
and, in criticizing the work of poet and a painter on the same subject they regard 
the differences of treatment observed in them as errors, which they blame on one 
or the other, depending on whether they happen to prefer painting or poetry. 
(Lessing 5) 
With Lessing, I agree that each individual medium must be considered in its own 
specificity, according to its own talents and failures; to view painting through the device 
and convention of poetry is to forbid painting to speak in its own language, or be judged 
according to its own merits. Accordingly, film cannot be reduced to the status of a static 
image, as with painting or photography, nor to captured movement, as with poetry, nor 
to the collaborative effort between dramaturge (director) and the theater (studio) in 
which the play (film) will be performed (shot). To take the medium-specificity 
hypothesis seriously requires that film, too, must be evaluated uniquely. To begin, we 
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should consider three ways philosophy characterizes film as a medium, and consider the 
advantages and limitations of these approaches. 
 
II.1.1. Film as Mimesis of Reality 
First, film is viewed as a realist medium in the mimetic sense: an opportunity to 
perfectly hold a mirror to reality, objectively preserving the world without succumbing 
to the imperfect subjectivity of the artist. Realist approaches to film thus often compare 
it to photography. Nineteenth-century innovations such as the silver nitrate camera 
obscura offered the opportunity to record an image in and of itself, an imprint of an 
image suspended in a material substance infinitely more precise than anything created by 
pens or brushes. From the realist perspective, increasing innovations in photography 
transform the artist from an active creator to a passive operator of a scientific and 
technological marvel: a bystander to the ultimate defeat of the degradation of time. The 
connection to film is clear: materially speaking, film is a series of photographs, single 
moments wrested out of time. When multiple photographs are combined in rapid 
succession, the result is a medium capable of capturing an entire experience: a running 
horse, a dancing woman, or a speeding train. 
For Walter Benjamin, this perspective of film as the ultimate scribe is the ideal 
candidate for mass dissemination of art, culture, and theater. Benjamin hopes that film 
might “meet the recipient halfway” by bringing the great works of art, music, sculpture, 
and architecture into the home of every individual, enabling cultural education for every 
socioeconomic class (Benjamin 21). Those who cannot access these cultural artifacts – 
  
 8 
or, perhaps, those who do not wish to put forth the “concentration and devotion” of the 
art lover – can enter the solitude and darkness of a theater and watch the world expand 
before them (Benjamin 40). The rise of the early travelogue films and the German 
Kulturfilm demonstrates this particular potential of realist cinema. Early travelogue films 
“functioned as a means to transport viewers to faraway and exotic locations,” (Alter 
197). For instance, Robert Flaherty’s Nanook of the North: A Story of Life and Love in 
the Actual Arctic (1922) depicts the daily life of Nanook, a Canadian Inuk. Through the 
film, viewers are offered safe passage to the Canadian arctic so that they might witness a 
foreign and primitive way of life without leaving the comfort of their theater seats. This 
film was acclaimed for its ability to truly record life in the unforgiving arctic, and 
audiences flocked to experience the trials of Nanook.  
On the surface, Nanook is a quintessential example of realist cinema: life, as it 
really happened, perfectly preserved on film. The formal qualities of the film follow this 
trend by employing the subjective perspective throughout the film so that “viewers of 
Nanook feel that it is their eyes, and not the camera’s, that are doing the seeing” 
(Christopher 381). However, early documentary and travelogue films did not necessarily 
uphold the same standards of precise documentation that the realists applauded. As Alter 
notes, “the term documentary was first used in photography in the late 1920s to refer to a 
type of photograph that documented or recorded “reality”; only later [1930s] was it 
applied to a “truthful,” “objective,” and nonfictional filmmaking practice” (Alter 197). 
Alter’s ironic use of truth and objectivity refers to the practice of staging dramatic 
components within travelogues and documentaries in order to prevent audience 
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boredom. In Nanook’s case, the walrus hunt is entirely scripted, including Nanook 
hunting with wooden spears instead of the guns that the Inuk had recently adopted 
(Christopher 387). Though the film still manages to serve Benjamin’s wishes to bridge 
the gap between cultures by bringing the world to the viewer, it, like many realist films, 
fails to fully cover over the presence of the artist. There is always someone behind the 
lens who decides what is included – and excluded – from each shot, even at the expense 
of objective recording of reality. Realists are shown to be idealists in this respect; they 
may insist that film is preserving reality in-and-of-itself, but they fail to admit the 
presence of artistic composition and manipulation – the “inescapable subjectivity” of the 
artist that never fully fades away (Bazin 12). 
 
II.1.2. Film as Romanticized Reality 
Not all realists seek to view film as a mimetic record of reality; some desire to 
view film capable of transmitting ideas, thoughts, feeling, and experiences. This 
romantic approach to film desires to “preserve the immediacy of the feeling” of the artist 
and “[pass] it on – not the situation or thing which simulated it” (Greenberg 62). This 
romantic realism is seemingly embarrassed that a medium is even required for 
transmission of the feeling or idea; these artists bemoan the intervening Ionic rings and 
desire the immediacy of Form to simply appear within the world, unfettered by the 
impurity of an embodied work of art. This embarrassment results in tireless effort to 
deny the presence of the medium, the artist, or the words by covering it over, disguising 
the artifice employed to create it, and presenting the work not as fabricated, but as 
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manifested. Arnheim notes that the introduction of sound to film is successful precisely 
because it heightens the realism of the work, allowing the audience “to take part in 
exciting events as fully as possible […] external events are shown concretely to the eye, 
and at the same time the thoughts, intentions, and emotions of the characters are 
communicated through words in the directest and most natural way” (Arnheim 226). By 
adding sound to film, the artist is able to remove the interruption of title cards and lessen 
the need for the audience to work at understanding the plot. Instead, it unfolds 
seamlessly, as realistic as if the audience was in the scene of the film experiencing the 
events themselves. Sound makes fights more exciting, speeches more dramatic, and the 
apparatus of the film less noticeable.  
Importantly, Arnheim is viewing film primarily as an entertainment medium, an 
opportunity for excitement and escapism, nothing more. His reluctance to include it 
alongside literature, his vision of the ideal medium, is due to its inherent hybridization. 
Film offers the drama of theater, but lacks its presence; it approximates the passion of 
music, but it becomes degraded by mechanical reproduction; it actualizes the movement 
of poetry, but never as fully as desired. For Arnheim, the muddling of “purer forms” of 
art into hybrids, such as the introduction of sound into motion pictures, results in “an 
impressive decline of artistic excellence” (Arnheim 230). Unlike Greenberg, 
hybridization does not simply result in a removal from the artist’s feeling, but runs the 
risk of a “blundering” away from “the purity of goodness and truth” (Arnheim 230). For 
Arnheim, film can only ever be a medium of entertainment because its hybridization 
disallows any access to truth or goodness.  
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This romantic approach to film reaches an apex that flirts with parody when 
Aldous Huxley demonstrates the logical conclusion to romantic realism in Brave New 
World. Huxley’s feelies are the ultimate aesthetic hybrid; they are capable of bringing 
the viewer’s every sense into direct connection with the artwork, ensuring absolute 
excitement and pleasure without a modicum of truth or goodness: 
The scent organ was playing a delightfully refreshing Herbal Cappriccio – 
rippling arpeggios of thyme and lavender, of rosemary, basil, myrtle, tarragon 
[…] In the synthetic music machine the soundtrack roll began to unwind. It was a 
trio for hyper-violin, super-cello, and oboe-surrogate that now filled the air with 
its agreeable languor. […] Sunk in their pneumatic stalls, Lenina and the Savage 
sniffed and listened. It was now the turn also for eyes and skin. (Huxley 167). 
This trip to the feelies aptly depicts a fear of many early and contemporary aesthetic 
theorists: that film technology will encourage the already present inclination to “live a 
life of unreality and fail to attain the true nature of man and its fitting manifestations” 
(Arnheim 230). There is a powerful fear that each additional material sieve placed 
between the artist and the viewer perverts and distorts the image, making any ethical 
ideal, social commentary, or human truth inaccessible – it also results in a limitation of 
the possibilities of engagement with film. It forms the basis for the critiques offered by 
Benjamin, Theodor Adorno, and Neil Postman when they caution against film’s ability 
to turn audiences into passive spectators: somnambulists who opt to absorb a fabricated 
reality rather than engage in, let alone improve upon, their lived worlds. 
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 Neither the realist nor the romantic approach to film fully actualizes its potential 
as a medium. The realist approach idealizes the medium as a scientific apparatus, 
capable of capturing reality in-and-of-itself, but it either fails to consider the presence of 
a human element in the process, or it seeks to cover over the sullied purity of the caged 
noumena. The romantic perspective also seeks to cover over the presence of the artist – 
not to heighten its reflection of reality, but so that the work appears to be manifested and 
not created. 
 
II.1.3. Film as Manipulated Reality 
We have previously discussed Benjamin in terms of his romantic hopes for the 
democratic possibilities of film. In “The Work of Art in the Age of Its Mechanical 
Reproducibility,” Benjamin does argue that film harbors the potential to contribute to the 
spectator’s political emancipation, but simultaneously poses the danger of pacifying its 
spectator. Benjamin credits these twin potentialities of passivity and awakening to the 
unique formal qualities of film. By “replicating a work many times over, [film] 
substitutes a mass existence for a unique existence,” disallowing the audience from 
engaging with it in any meaningful way (Benjamin 22). Though film does have the 
potential to teach humanity how to engage with the expanding presence of technology, 
Benjamin worries that film will fall prey to propaganda, manipulation, and nefarious 
control.  
 Benjamin demonstrates this concern in his discussion of the distinction between 
photography and classic painting. For Benjamin, photography is a liminal stage between 
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the human labor required to produce previous visual media, such as painting, and the 
technological labor required for the production of film. A photograph stands between 
these two extremes: like painting, it requires that a single artist select and engage a 
single subject; like film, it necessarily requires technological apparatus for the 
production of the finished artwork. Benjamin is interested in the resulting differences of 
audience reception of a painting versus a photograph. A painting, he contends, permits 
the viewer to engage with it in whatever manner she chooses; however, in engaging with 
a photograph, Benjamin contends that “free-floating contemplating is no longer 
appropriate” (Benjamin 27). The subject of the photograph is mediated not simply 
through the artist but also through a mechanical apparatus, forcing the viewer to engage 
with the artwork on its terms, not her own. Here, we see Bazin’s “inescapable 
subjectivity” rear its head again, preventing direct access to the subject of the work by 
exposing the presence of the artist responsible for the artifact (Bazin 12). 
 The intervention of the artist in a photograph, and thus the corresponding 
controlled perception of the viewer, can be found in the use of captions that are often 
contradictory to the subject of the photograph. As evidence, Benjamin cites the 
photographs of Eugène Atget as quintessentially “demanding a specific kind of 
reception,” one that is suggested to the viewer through the addition of a caption meant to 
inform and direct the viewer to the artist’s intended subject in the composition. For 
example, a 1913 photograph features an image of a shoemaker’s shop, flanked by two 
strings of shoes for sale, above which sits an ornate iron filigree balcony (Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Eugène Atget. “Balcon, 17 rue du Petit-Pont,” 1913. George Eastman House. Web. 
ArtStor. 3 June 2015. 
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Upon first glance, the photo appears to be of the shoemaker’s shop with an abundance of 
handmade merchandise for sale; just one shop of many on a busy Paris street. Atget 
elected to caption this photo “Balcon, 17 rue du Petit-Pont,” thus titling the photograph 
after a seemingly accidental element of the composition. The balcony only occupies one 
third of the frame, and its bourgeois decoration contrasts sharply with the decidedly 
working-class nature of the other two-thirds of the photograph. Rather than dismiss the 
balcony as an unrelated element to the subject of the work, Atget’s caption highlights it 
as the primary component of the photograph, and thus draws the viewer’s attention 
inescapably towards it. 
 One argument for such a mislabeling is to increase the exchange value of the 
image, “to assure the potential buyer that he was getting what he wanted – a photograph 
of a rare old wrought-iron balcony” (Szarkowski 74). Labeling an unsold photograph 
was common practice when Atget entered the industry. Photographers were able to 
employ the “dry plate” system, a method that allowed many more photographs to be 
produced in a given day. Rather than rely on specific customer orders, “photographers 
[could make] photographs that no one had asked for, hoping to find the customer later” 
(Szarkowski 74). In constructing this caption, Atget is anticipating the specific 
sensibility of his future clientele while still preserving the more interesting, yet unnamed 
focus on the industrialization of the shoemaking industry, the decline of traditional 
cobbling, and the faceless menace of technological industrialization. Though, as 
Benjamin points out, Atget’s photographed his surroundings “like scenes of crimes,” the 
caption permits this damning critique to be overlooked in favor of an aesthetically 
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pleasing feature of the composition. Like many beginning artists in the age of 
mechanical reproduction, Atget frequently found himself at odds with his clients’ 
shortsighted understanding of art: 
He resisted working on assignment, since customers did not know what to 
photograph, presumably meaning that they did not know exactly what to 
photograph. They knew that the balcony was a subject, but not that the shoes 
were part of it. (Szarkowski 74). 
Atget’s oeuvre indicates a master at work, yet he believed himself to be a master at the 
mercy of the whims of popular taste. Atget straddles the perilous boundary between, 
first, producing a work of art that reflects and critiques his socio-economic zeitgeist, and, 
second, securing the necessary income to continue his work. The result is a work of art 
that makes a statement while simultaneously obfuscating that statement. The passive 
viewer can obey the caption and admire the balcony; but there is always the option to 
find within the photograph a second statement that demands further consideration.  
 For Benjamin, this masking of one idea behind another is exponentially 
heightened in film. He envisions film as eighteen composed photographs per second, 
each pregnant with a message other than that indicated in the caption. Due to this 
possibility, Benjamin optimistically insists that “film is the first art form capable of 
showing how matter interferes with people’s lives” (Hansen 203). Film can demonstrate 
the truth of a historical situation in a way that is far more personal that a direct statement 
or philosophical treatise; it imparts this knowledge to the audience as part of collective 
entertainment. As mentioned above, Benjamin worries that there will always be 
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individuals who wish to “evade” the necessary work to understand “new tasks of 
apperception” (Benjamin 40). In this case, the work required is learning how to look 
beneath the captions – in a film, captions can take the form of dialogue, narrative 
conventions, contrived endings, and specific formal and stylistic choices – just as they 
did in “Balcon, 17 rue du Petit-Pont” (Benjamin 40). Those who can learn to view film 
in this active way, aware that captions are not always what they seem, will be able find 
in film social issues that might otherwise be ignored. 
Just as Atget captioned his photograph in the hopes of attracting a wealthy buyer, 
Benjamin worries that the economic demands placed on film will result in the film 
industry acting on its “overriding interest in stimulating the involvement of the masses 
through illusionary displays and ambiguous speculations” (Benjamin 34). His concerns 
are echoed today by critics worried that the economic mandate of producing films has 
watered down any artistic value of films to pure spectacle. In a piece published in the 
New York Times, Susan Sontag aptly expresses this sentiment: 
The reduction of cinema to assaultive images, and the unprincipled manipulation 
of images (faster and faster cutting) to make them more attention-grabbing, has 
produced a disincarnated, lightweight cinema that doesn’t demand anyone’s full 
attention. […] The sheer ubiquity of moving images has steadily undermined the 
standards people once had both for cinema as art and for cinema as popular 
entertainment. (Sontag) 
Certainly, Sontag’s diagnosis of the “death of cinephilia,” or the decreasing desire to see 
films as “unique, unrepeatable, magic experiences” dovetails with Benjamin’s own 
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concerns (Sontag). However, the other side of Benjamin’s dialectic of film offers an 
optimistic possibility for philosophically liberating film from being considered as 
manipulative, sensational, or devoid of artistic merit.  
 
II.2. The Classical Paradigm 
We have thus far explored the downfalls to viewing film according to the realist 
paradigm. In order to deepen the consideration of film as a medium, we will now explore 
a specific era that is often read according to the realist paradigm: The Hollywood 
Classical Period.  
David Bordwell’s definition of classical film (1917-1960) follows the modus 
operandi of any classical era of art: it is artwork in which “notions of decorum, 
proportion, formal harmony, respect for tradition, mimesis, self-effacing craftsmanship, 
and cool control of the perceiver’s response” are required (Bordwell 4). For film, this 
means that Aristotelian realism is the highest aim; a film is classical if and only if it 
contains a fabricated reality, with no trace of the filmic apparatus that formed it, and a 
clear narrative, conclusion, and message (Bordwell 3). Most importantly, the paradigm 
asserts that classical film does not seek to challenge or deviate from the aesthetic norms 
of its period as it is shaped and maintained by the material demands placed on film as an 
economic medium. The concern here is twofold: first, that classical film is essentially 
pure, unconcerned with challenging the ideals of its era; and secondly, that conformity 
ensures continued success. The cost of producing and exhibiting films is high, and any 
deviation from the formula understood by the audience will result in a box office flop. 
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Like Atget’s photographs, film is a front-end investment: without the continued influx of 
profits, the production of future films cannot be assured. Thus, classical film becomes 
characterized as a period in which commercial success reigns supreme, and artistic, 
intellectual, and ethical concerns are either not present, or “subversive moments” in an 
otherwise cohesive oeuvre (Bordwell 81). 
To give an example of the limitations inherent in Bordwell’s attempt to broadly 
typify films in the era, consider his evaluation of film noir. While most of his work is 
marked by a profound attention to the formal aspects of film, film noir is defined as a 
type of rebellion against the above mentioned “norms” of classical genre, style, and tone 
(4). This not a positive movement “to define a coherent genre or style” but a critical 
effort “to locate in several American films a challenge to dominant values” (75). This 
ambiguous definition allows the critique to be found within a wide range of films: any 
film that seeks to attack “psychological causality,” “heterosexual romance,” “the 
motivated happy ending,” or “a criticism of classical technique” is classified as film noir 
(75). Thus, film noir is found disseminated throughout a variety of styles and genres – 
westerns, detective dramas, melodramas, woman’s films, and biopics – anywhere that 
“nonconformity” can arise within a Hollywood film (75). This broad and nonspecific 
category, according to Bordwell’s analysis, serves to group together any films that 
critique the “American values prominent in mainstream Hollywood cinema” (76). 
Problematically, Bordwell does not indicate whether these are the values espoused by 
the narrative of the film, or the values held by classical Hollywood cinema as the canon 
he claims it to be (76). Alternate definitions of film noir offer a much clearer definition 
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of the style, and are able to agree on films that share specific stylistic characteristics 
other than mere nonconformity. These definitions also define as film noir films fiercely 
defended by Bordwell as classical, such as “The Maltese Falcon and Citizen Kane” 
(Schatz 233). While these films are formally classical according to Bordwell’s analysis, 
they have been read as stylistically film noir by a number of scholars – but not due to 
their critical stances on the “values” of classical film. 
As we see in the case of Bordwell, the formal characteristics of films from this 
era are commonly discussed in terms of the development of other art forms, not in terms 
of film’s own development as a medium. While it must be the case that “before there are 
auteurs, there are constraints; before there are deviations, there are norms,” when it is 
applied to film, the origin of the “norms” in question is often taken from other media 
(Bordwell 4). The temptation to view film as necessarily following the early 
development process experienced by literature, music, theater, and photography is 
reasonable: film owes an undeniable debt of existence to these media. However, I reject 
the claim that the medium of cinema must necessarily be classified, critiqued, and 
appraised according to the same constraints and norms of other works of art: it is just as 
likely that film is the auteur or derivation arising from a previous history of aesthetic 
effort. This applies equally to its inception as it does to its contemporary work.  
We need not look far for an example from early cinema that incorporates the 
innovations of other media in order to develop a new style of its own. For instance, 
Robert Wiene’s The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari (1920) owes not just its style but also its 
psychological dimension to expressionist painting:  
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With its oblique chimneys on pell-mell roofs, its windows in the form of arrows 
or kites and its treelike arabesques that were threats rather than trees, Holstenwall 
resembled those visions of unheard-of cities which the painter Lyonel Feininger 
evoked through his edgy, crystalline compositions. In addition, the ornamental 
system in Caligari expanded through space, annulling its conventional aspect by 
means of painted shadows in disharmony with the lighting effects, and zigzag 
delineations designed to effect all rules of perspective. (Kracauer 69). 
The use of painted backgrounds, spatially impossible buildings, and heavy shadows 
(Figure 2) allowed Wiene and Holstenwall to create a style that effectively “[rendered] 
the notions of sick brains” and elevated Caligari to its acclaimed status today (Kracauer 
70). The choice to employ expressionism rather than Janowitz’s first choice of 
surrealism indicates a desire to connect to a school of painting that is very medium-
conscious (Kracauer 67).  
Expressionist artists are very concerned with the status of painting in a modern 
society, and their work attempts to challenge the boundaries of painting as it has 
previously been understood. Conversely, the surrealists sought to escape the modern 
world by mocking convention with absurdity. Caligari follows the expressionist creed 
much more closely by challenging the status of madness and the rise of psychiatry; thus, 
the use of expressionistic style enhances the film’s attention to the contradictions of 
modern medicine in a way that escapism could not accomplish. Against Arnheim, the 
hybridization of film and painting enhances the stylistic, artistic, and philosophic value 
of these films. 
  
 22 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari. Dir. Robert Wiene. 1920. Kino on Video, 2002. DVD. 
The impact of expressionism in film. 
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 We see this hybridization again in the incorporation of surrealist elements in 
Fritz Lang’s Metropolis (1927). While the surrealist creed is inappropriate to Caligari’s 
underlying message, surrealism successfully enhances the sense of bourgeois desire for 
escapism and rejection of reality in Metropolis. In the scenes in the Pleasure Gardens, 
we see that the sons of the city leaders live in a Bacchanalian paradise; they are 
blissfully unaware of the trials of the workers operating their great metropolis. When the 
now robotic Maria makes her sensuous appearance in the club, the superimposition of 
Dali-esque eyes on top of her gyrating hips elevates the commentary from one of 
ignorance to one of complete removal from reality (Figure 3). Just as the surrealists 
sought to escape from the trials of reality, the nightclub scene depicts the rulers’ 
complete separation from the city below. The incorporation of surrealist elements is the 
vehicle through which this stronger message is able to emerge.  
In the above examples, films incorporate art in order to enhance the underlying 
message of the film. The hybridization allows the film to further its own purposes by 
deepening the emotional and intellectual weight of the image while placing it in a larger 
artistic context. While homage is nothing new in art, the transformative power of media 
combination is uniquely powerful in film.  
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Figure 3: Metropolis. Dir. Fritz Lang. 1927. Kino International, 2010. DVD. A surreal screen of 
eyes takes over Maria’s dance. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Eugène Delacroix, Don Juan’s Shipwreck. 1841. Art, Archeology and Architecture 
Div., Erich Lessing Culture and Fine Arts Archives. Web. ArtStor. 3 June 2015. 
Romanticism cannot depict satire. 
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For an alternate perspective, consider Eugène Delacroix’s The Shipwreck of Don 
Juan (1841). While this painting is a direct depiction of a scene from the second Canto 
of Byron’s Don Juan, and is thus homage to the literary work, the Romantic style of the 
painting gives no indication of the satire running throughout the poem itself. Delacroix’s 
work simply offers a different interpretation of Byron; unlike Caligari and Metropolis, 
Don Juan’s Shipwreck does nothing to enhance the critical apparatus of the poem 
(Figure 4). According to traditional aesthetic theory, the pastiche of painting found in 
Caligari and Metropolis should not appear until film’s post-modern stage, and certainly 
not within the early decades of film’s existence. The permeation of expressionist and 
surrealist painting into the films is strong evidence of the continued development of film 
as a critical apparatus – development that is different than that found in painting, 
literature, music, and sculpture.  
To make the claim that classical Hollywood film is nothing more than an attempt 
to produce the purist – and thus lucrative – conventions in film is an unfortunate 
underestimation of the auteurs of the time. As will be expounded at length in Chapter IV, 
numerous films can be read as attentive – and often acerbic – characterizations and 
critiques of the film industry and medium. Formally classical films such as Citizen Kane 
(1941), Sullivan’s Travels (1941), and A Star Is Born (1937) enjoyed immense 
commercial, popular, and critical acclaim while still making themselves available as 
vehicles for challenging and developing the status of film. 
It is important that these films contain tried and true conventional formulas, 
because as Lessing notes, if a format is too odd, the audience will resist it: “what they 
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see they do not like; and what the artist wants them to think, they do not know” (Lessing 
64). A sudden deployment of a new film style is neither theoretically nor practically 
wise, and many a flop has been credited to a film being simply too strange for audiences. 
The classical Hollywood films are able to challenge the conventional rules of film 
precisely because they remain within the paradigm while challenging it. They are 
complicitous critiques: formally and stylistically structured so that they can “install and 
reinforce as much as undermine and subvert the conventions and presuppositions it 
appears to challenge” in an attempt to call into question the film’s status as a medium 
(Hutcheon 2). Without the legitimization of the paradigm, the critical effect cannot be 
fully achieved. 
This phenomenon is not restricted to film: in painting, the abstract expressionists 
had to resort to references to children’s paintings in order to support their theory of 
expression without representation, a theory decried as “too avant-garde” for popular 
tastes (Greenberg). In music, the legend of Schoenberg’s riot-inducing atonal 
performance in Vienna in 1913 continues to thrive, as does the controversy surrounding 
John Cage’s first performance of 4’33”, a performance of silence that was 
misunderstood as a silent performance. Cage’s statement that “they [the audience] 
missed the point” precisely demonstrates Lessing’s claim that in order to push the 
boundaries of a medium, permutation is far more successful than reinvention or direct 
attack (Kostelanetz 70). Aesthetic novelty is not “a distinct and coherent alternative”: 
abstraction rather than representation, atonal rather than tonal, silence rather than music 
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(Bordwell 81). Development of a medium only happens in isolated incidents and large 
steps when seen through a long historical lens. 
Aesthetic novelty could perhaps be demonstrated through a case study of Gregg 
Toland. David Bordwell and Andre Bazin argue that Citizen Kane is responsible for the 
unheralded use of deep-focus cinematography, a novel technique that simply appeared, 
fully formed.
2
 Contrary to this perspective of novelty as virgin birth, Phillip Cowan 
argues “that these directors did not independently, or in some great conspiratorial 
gesture, begin using these new techniques simultaneously” (Cowan 81). He credits the 
“sole” and underappreciated effort of Gregg Toland for the conception, innovation, and 
development of deep-focus cinematography over a period of years, films, directors, and 
studios (Cowan 81). Toland’s efforts were not restricted to the specific composition, 
sequencing, or lighting of deep-focus cinematography; famously, Toland ensured that he 
captured the desired shot by grinding unique lenses on set if conventional lenses could 
not accomplish the task (Cowan).  
Even so, Cowan neglects to delve into the filmic influences that shaped Toland’s 
work to craft deep-focus cinematography. The 1920s is replete with examples of scenes 
filmed in extreme depth to allow multiple levels of action. To return to Metropolis, the 
Moloch sacrifice scene is a superb example of an early precursor to deep-focus 
cinematography that shares the same aesthetic qualities. As with Citizen Kane, oversized 
sets allowed cinematographers to stage multiple levels of action in a single shot. Freder’s 
visit to the machine room features three levels of action: deepest is the head of the 
machine or Moloch in the vision, the middle level contains the operations of the workers 
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and the constant clouds of steam, and the shallowest level is the entrance to the steps 
where workers recover from their injuries, or, in the vision, march towards their doom. 
Aesthetically, this displays the same characteristics of deep-focus cinematography: a 
wide field in which the viewer is invited to choose their focus, rather than be restricted to 
a single subject in a close frame. Over the years, similar shots allowed 
cinematographers, like Toland, to develop lenses capable of capturing such a deep shot 
without losing clarity. This dedication to minor permutations and alterations of existing 
equipment and techniques over years is precisely the type of effort that contributes to the 
development of film – and the elevation of the most important and influential films of 
the classical period to the status of art. 
 
II.3. Benjamin, Receptivity, and Ritual 
Up to this point, we have considered three flawed philosophical diagnoses of 
film. Considering film as mimetic realism, romanticized realism, or manipulated reality 
ultimately degrades the possibility of engaging with film as an art form. As we saw in 
Sontag’s diagnosis, the necessity to find a working philosophical approach to film is 
both timely and pressing. Reviving cinephilia is not just a matter of aesthetic pleasure; 
reawakening the public love of film can open an opportunity for critical, intellectual, and 
existential engagement with a work of art.  
In order to do this, we must expand Benjamin’s greatest hopes for film, found in 
the other half of his dialectic. We can do this by drawing from Benjamin’s discussions of 
the engagement with art through habit, specifically as experienced in architecture: the 
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more audiences become acclimated to the aesthetic requirements of a technology, the 
greater the possibility that they will “absorb the work of art into themselves” in their 
distraction, and, like a parasite, any hidden message it might contain (Benjamin 39). This 
absorption is “a different kind of participation,” one that awakens the distracted audience 
through “shock effects” that strike each individual to the core (Benjamin 39). These 
shocks work to startle the individual into awareness and engagement with the film itself, 
thus opening them up to the possibility of engaging with a film meaningfully, as a 
ritual.
3
 Viewing film as a ritual allows us to assuage some of Benjamin’s pessimistic 
concerns.  
Benjamin offers a consideration of ritual in his discussion of film-habit, but 
neglects to expand the argument to its most fruitful conclusion. He explicitly states that 
film lacks a traditional aura, and thus cannot be “an object of devotion” for the viewer. 
He neglects to consider the ritual behavior exhibited by the film-watching public from 
cinema’s earliest days. Viewers of all ages flocked to the cinema to view the latest 
attractions, premiers of films attracted well-heeled audiences, and celebrity culture 
reached a fever pitch. The popularity of the cinema became so widespread that it caught 
the attention of public interest groups who fought to decrease the attendance of women 
and children (Pearson and Uricchio).
4
 By the 1930s, the cult of film was firmly 
established, as evidenced by the popularity of amateur cinematography and fan 
magazines such as Photoplay. The cathedrals of the church of film – theaters – command 
ritualistic behavior such as specific times for viewing, “ritual posture” in the seats, and 
monetary offerings to ensure maintenance of the performance (Benjamin 39).  
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Film as a ritual performance offers each individual viewer the ability to choose 
his or her degree of engagement, from the distraction depicted by Debord to the 
absorption of the art lover in the gallery. Those seeking the pure shock value of film can 
find it in this space, and leave fulfilled by another session in the cathedral of cinema. For 
those who find that the shock value of film is too overt, and seek instead for an 
opportunity to engage with the film in a more cerebral manner, they, too, are welcome to 
do so. Against Benjamin, the cathedral of cinema does not unify viewers into an 
unthinking mass; it individualizes viewers. In the dark, viewers can choose to join in 
with the raucous laughter of the crowd, or remain silent. Alone with their thoughts, they 
can wait with bated breath for the murderer to be revealed; or they can consider the 
deeper implications of narrative at work. Just like any religious service, the degree of 
participation, degree of belief, and desired result are up to each individual parishioner; 
they are united in their presence in the ritual space, but deeply alone in their reception of 
the performance. 
By opening up this space, we enable a movement away from the perspective of 
film as mimetic realism, romanticized realism, or fabricated realism. We can reject the 
notion of the audience as a mindless conglomeration, and instead consider the way in 
which film offers an opportunity for critical engagement to its viewers. We need not 
think of film’s primary power as Socrates’s gadfly: a sting that spurs individuals into 
action with a sudden jolt of violence, drama, or tragedy. Instead, we ought to consider 
film’s similarities to the Socratic approach broadly construed: humble, friendly, and 
ultimately instilling an inescapable sense of doubt and wonder in the recipient. Like 
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Socrates, films engaged in complicitous critique do not claim to know or say anything 
beyond that of the average film; yet in them can be found breadcrumbs of doubt which 
open the possibility for knowledge, interpretation, and judgment to fall upon the viewer 
– if he or she is willing to undertake that responsibility.5 
Similarly, our approach to film need not be an either/or: it is not necessary that 
we choose between fulfilling Huxley’s prophecy, or take up the Savage’s slogan: “I 
don’t think you ought to see things like that” (Huxley 169). Our familiarity and 
veneration for Shakespeare, Rembrandt, and Mozart does not mandate that we treat 
cinema with shock or outright rejection. Film is a both/and: it can be both entertaining 
and express artistic truth; it can be both escapism and realism; it can both make us feel 
and make us think. Film is a space for engagement with art that is highly individualist, 
easily accessible, and in possession of the powers of many other media. The theory that 
there are works of art capable of all of these accomplishments is dismissed seemingly 
not because it is practically impossible, but because our theoretical framework has not 
yet made room for it. Films that present reality, truth, and entertainment are not as hard 
to come by as aesthetic purists might hope. 
When a “well-known story, well-known characters,” or well known structure is 
at work in the artwork, the work can “make [itself] understood to [its] audience” and 
thus “arouse their interest” much more quickly (Lessing 64). Thus, a film that adheres to 
formally classical style can suggest a critique of the conventions, values, or medium of 
film without requiring “laborious reflection and guessing” on the part of the audience, as 
Cage experienced. Viewers are already immersed in the narrative, willing to “linger 
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before the work” longer than with a nonconventional or challenging work of art (64). 
Done properly, Benjamin’s greatest hope can be achieved: “the alignment of reality with 
the masses and of the masses with reality,” offering the possibility of critical 
engagement not only with the work, but also with the world (Benjamin 24). While these 
films will be read as offering dramatic critiques of convention and expeditions into new 
possibilities for the medium, it must be noted that they equally permit passive 
enjoyment. It is this willingness to not only be complicit in convention and 
commercialism, but to strive to excel at it, that allows the possibility of complicitous 
critique. 
If we grant the theses that film as a medium (a) ought to be considered in its own 
right, not according to the standards and conventions of other media, (b) has existed as a 
medium interested in consistently and intentionally developing its artistic, social, and 
ethical capabilities, and (c) and has been dedicated to this pursuit from its inception, we 
can continue to increase the space for critical engagement with this medium, as film 
theorists have worked to do for decades.
6
 Further, if we accept that film offers a space 
for engagement with the image that does not relegate the viewer to a passive spectator, 
then we open the possibility of viewing film as an opportunity to engage with political, 
social, ethical, and intellectual issues, not simply as entertainment. Finally, if we posit, 
against Arnheim, that film’s hybridization actually heightens its ability to access purity, 
goodness, and truth in the human condition, and that the audience’s engagement is 
worthwhile, then locating specific examples of this kind of film is paramount. First, we 
must evaluate to what extent this new paradigm is required socially, not simply 
  
 33 
academically. The next chapter will explore the social and cultural need for film’s 
“[capability to] show how matter interferes with people’s lives” by offering an 
existential opportunity to experience a critical viewpoint of sociological, philosophical, 
and ethical conditions (Hansen 203). 
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NOTES
                                                 
     
1
 Broadly speaking, the medium-specificity hypothesis states that every medium must 
be judged according to unique aesthetic judgments, not according to the aesthetic 
considerations of any other medium. For instance, critcizing the imagery of a poem 
compared to that found in a painting is neither appropriate nor conducive to critical 
analysis of either medium. For further information regarding the medium specificity 
hypothesis, see Marshall McLuhan’s Understanding Media or Linda Hutcheon’s The 
Politics of Postmodernism. For arguments that reject the medium-specificity hypothesis, 
see David Bordwell’s The Classical Hollywood Cinema: Film Style and Mode of 
Production to 1960 or Rudolf Arnheim’s Film as Art. 
     
2
 It should be noted that Bordwell hedges by noting that “a string of similar efforts” 
appeared around the time of Kane’s release (Bordwell 344). 
     
3
 Both Tom Gunning and Miriam Hansen have performed ample work to demonstrate 
the ways in which this approach has proven successful. See especially Miriam Hansen’s 
Cinema and Experience: Siegfried Kracauer, Walter Benjamin, and Theodor Adorno, 
and Tom Gunning’s “Buster Keaton or The Work of Comedy in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction.” 
     
4
 These moral crusades will receive fuller consideration in Chapter III. 
     
5
 Cf. Sartre’s consideration of littérature engagée, wherein the author bears the 
responsibility to produce a text in tune with the political struggles of her time, and the 
reader bears the responsibility to engage with the text as deeply as possible.  
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6
 A discussion of the historical popularity and specific focus of film studies will be 
offered in Chapter III. 
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CHAPTER III 
FILM AS CRITICAL PEDAGOGY 
 
The early discussions of film and photography may seem quaint in today’s digital 
world, given the advent of the Internet, globalized communications, streaming video, 
and satellite television. Indeed, many current debates about media ethics take their 
starting point from the Internet revolution, and offer considerations about the ways in 
which these new forms of entertainment and communication are accommodating, 
altering, and obliterating traditional modes of human communication.
7
 
 While these discussions are crucial in contemporary scholarship, many of them 
sidestep the question of where film fits into this digitalized, always-connected 
worldview. Certainly, film has developed narratively, technologically, and economically 
since the Hollywood Classical era, but the basic concept remains the same: viewers sit 
before a screen (either in the cathedral of a theater or in their own living room) and enter 
into an opportunity to engage with a film. The possibility that film might offer the same 
kind of critical engagement applauded in the nineteenth-century literary world is only 
beginning to merit serious and sustained consideration from philosophy.
8
 Thus, taking a 
cue from the work of Neil Postman, Allan Bloom, and Theodor Adorno, this chapter will 
evaluate the rise of anti-intellectualism, the permeation of visual media in today’s 
culture, and the need for an avenue for critical engagement for the students who will 
someday constitute the public – such as the one offered in the act of watching a film. 
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III.1. The Decline of Critical Thought; The Rise of the Age of the Spectacle 
We should not be surprised that with the rise of the film industry we also witness 
a rise in complaints about the resulting “dumbing-down” of the public. This is a familiar 
argument to aesthetic scholars: when the novel made its debut in the eighteenth-century, 
“the first literary genre that came into existence as a commodity,” the response from the 
English elite was moral panic (Vogrinčič 109). The novel was charged with being 
responsible for degradation of moral character, distraction from domestic 
responsibilities, and furthering the decline of the education of the public. Vogrinčič cites 
one particularly hysterical response in which the author claims to “have actually seen 
mothers, in miserable garrets, crying for the imaginary distress of an heroine, while their 
children were crying for bread” (Vogrinčič 104). In short, the novel was roundly decried 
as the most dangerous idle occupation of the English lower and middle classes.  
From our contemporary perspective, this moral panic is entirely unjustified; the 
importance of reading books – novels as much as the classics – is so crucial to the 
development of cultured, wise, and critically engaged students that without it “even the 
idea of the order of the whole is lost” (Bloom 58).  Yet, as Vogrinčič demonstrates, the 
emergence of a new behavior, genre, or medium is almost always accompanied by “a 
heightened level of concern over the (supposed) behavior of a certain group or category, 
and the consequences that this behavior presumably causes for the rest of society” 
(Vogrinčič 106). Sociologists refer to this phenomenon as “moral panic,” or, more 
recently, “media panic,” to reflect the derogatory response that educators, artists, 
moralists, and politicians launch against an emerging medium. Although the term moral 
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panic was not coined until 1971 in relation to a sociological study of the fear of drug 
use,
9
 it is nothing new. A similar response can be found in Plato’s Republic and The 
Seventh Letter against the rise of writing for education; and the emergence of the 
printing press produced not only mass concern about the availability of books to the 
lower and middle classes, but was also the condition for the possibility of Luther’s 
protestant revolution.  
Similarly, the fear that film is capable of encouraging the degradation of 
humanity dates back to the emergence of moving pictures as an entertainment venue. 
Complaints ranged from poor lighting and air quality in the theaters to truancy in school 
children, but they ultimately hinged on a concern over the moral impact cinema has on 
its viewers: 
The exclusion of improper books from public libraries and circulating libraries is 
pretty closely attended to. Yet no group of libraries in the world have [sic] ever 
possessed the influence over susceptible children, and over all minds in the 
formative and impressionable stage, that the motion picture exerts today. It is 
probably the greatest single force in shaping the American character. (“The 
Moving Picture and the National Character” 320). 
This concern grew so widespread in New York City at the turn of the twentieth century 
that in 1911, “the City of New York prohibited the admission of unaccompanied minors 
under the age of sixteen to any place where moving pictures were shown under a 
common show license” (Pearson and Uricchio 71). The emergence of a new medium 
changes the way in which humans view and interact with the world. Importantly, we 
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must remember that just as media panics accompany the emergence of each new 
medium, concerns about social, intellectual, and moral impact continue with the 
maturation of the medium in question. A reevaluation of the concerns expressed by 
philosophers against the educational and moral value of film will follow so that we 
might return to and deepen the original concerns about film expressed over a century 
ago. 
Following Marshall McLuhan’s mantra “the medium is the message,” theorists 
have taken to critcizing the possibilities for critical intellectual engagement with a 
variety of visual media.
10
 Foremost among these is Neil Postman, whose Amusing 
Ourselves to Death is as relevant today as it was in its initial publication in 1985, and 
finds a place among many syllabi each semester. Further, Allan Bloom, whose Closing 
of the American Mind offers a Nietzschean account of the decline of culture as a result of 
the absence of reading, is providing inspiration for Arendtian analyses of the rise of the 
Last Man, as evidenced by the decline in social and political involvement in America.
11
 
Postman and Bloom, both of whom taught at the university level for most of their 
professional lives, both identify a decline in the critical thinking abilities of their 
students and arrive at complementary conclusions as to the cause: the rise of watching 
and the decline of reading. While each offers compelling arguments as to how the 
decline in reading is resulting in wide-spread moral relativity (Bloom) and the 
realization of the Huxleyan prophecy (Postman), this analysis seeks to consider the 
possibility that the decline in critical thought is not due to the inability to read, but rather 
the inability to read the medium en vogue: film. 
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In The Closing of the American Mind, Bloom’s major concern is that the absence 
of an adequate education in reading classic literature and philosophy cuts students off 
from inheriting – let alone understanding – any cultural tradition. Bloom argues that 
without the strict core curriculum of the classics, students find themselves “seeking for 
enlightenment wherever it is readily available, without being able to distinguish between 
the sublime and trash, insight and propaganda” (Bloom 64). The absence of classic 
education results in an identity crisis for most students; they are incapable of describing 
themselves narratively with any depth, and lack the skills required to navigate or 
contribute to the political and social life they enter into as adults.  
Regardless of this missing element in their education, Bloom insists that his 
students instinctually seek a guide in self-interpretation, either in shallow literature (here, 
he cites Catcher in the Rye as an example) or in the commercially oriented world of 
Hollywood cinema. While shallow literature allows the opportunity to segue into “better 
writers [who] can help them more,” cinema disallows any growth (Bloom 63). All that 
cinema can offer is “interested moralisms […] largely designed to further passing 
political movements and to appeal to simplistic needs for greatness – or to insinuating 
flattery of their secret aspirations and vices, giving them a sense of significance” (Bloom 
64). This sense of significance, however, is not an authentic one; rather than embark on 
their own existential journeys of discovery, students faced with cinema frequently 
choose to adapt themselves to one of several pre-scripted identities proffered by the 
motion picture industry. This concern over the abolition of authentic individuality 
echoes Horkheimer and Adorno’s concerns in “The Culture Industry.” For Horkheimer 
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and Adorno, one essential element of the culture industry is that “the mechanically 
differentiated products are ultimately all the same,” a position that he holds equally 
when discussing the difference in brands of automobiles as much as the distinction 
between Hollywood starlets (Horkheimer and Adorno 97). Horkheimer and Adorno and 
Bloom all worry that the narrative types found in cinema – not simply restricted to 
personality but also to narrative trajectory – have ceased to be mythological tropes, as 
observed by Joseph Campbell, and have become advertised products for consumption. 
Just like Bloom, Horkheimer and Adorno decry the culture industry, especially cinema, 
for restricting the individual’s ability to existentially shape him or herself. Instead, they 
offer “ideal types” that are presented as possible realities for the viewers:  
The way in which the young girl accepts and performs the obligatory date, the 
tone of voice used on the telephone and in the most intimate situations, the 
choice of words in conversation, indeed, the whole inner life compartamentalized 
according to the categories of vulgarized depth psychology, bears witness to the 
attempt to turn oneself into an apparatus meeting the requirements of success, an 
apparatus which, even in its unconscious impulses, conforms to the model 
presented by the culture industry. (Horkheimer and Adorno 135-136). 
Horkheimer and Adorno’s concern is that the monotony of the culture industry prohibits 
any alternative perspective from which to view the world. Women who previously might 
have harbored personal and professional dreams are instead restricted to the identity they 
see reflected back to them on the screen. For Bloom, this restriction is brought about as a 
result of a lack of other artistic mentors – no classic literature, drama, or narrative to 
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inspire a different direction. For Horkheimer and Adorno, this restriction is the 
manipulation of a larger culture industry. As Horkheimer and Adorno warn, the culture 
industry does not seek to nurture, but to restrict and amalgamate – and the industry is so 
skilled in its operation that the women neglect to recognize the shrinking of potential 
that they experience when presented only with the screen. 
Similarly, Bloom finds the cinema to be vacant of any real intellectual or 
spiritual depth for his students. Rather than offer them an opportunity to engage with the 
timeless philosophical questions that can guide them to authentic self-creation, the 
cinema merely reflects back the present moment, “the here and now,” obliterating the 
traditions of the past and narrowing the promise of the future (Bloom 64). This 
disconnection from tradition prevents students from “[discovering] what is most serious 
about themselves,” what makes them unique, valuable, and worthwhile (Bloom 64). 
Bloom’s primary claims about the degradation of individual development and critical 
thought are appropriate, and dovetail nicely with Adorno’s early concerns about the 
Culture Industry as a whole. Though Bloom insists throughout The Closing of the 
American Mind that a classical education is the only method of rescuing the sinking ship 
of American intellectualism, Adorno’s later works offer a possibility for including film 
within that education – an opportunity that will be discussed at length in the next section. 
 
III.2. Écriture and Engagement 
Neil Postman classifies television as “the third great crisis in Western education”; 
the first was the transition to a written culture in Athens, and the second was the 
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invention of the printing press in the fifteenth-century (Postman 145). For Postman, 
television merits the title of crisis because it, like the two crises that preceded it, is 
changing not only the shape, speed, and structure of the world, but the way in which its 
human inhabitants think about and engage with the world. Here, Postman’s language is 
perhaps a bit inflammatory; the word crisis holds the connotation of a state of 
emergency, a dangerous situation – in short, a panic. As argued above, these are not 
crises, but media panic about the paradigm shifts brought about by the emergence of a 
new medium. In reality, all that Postman is observing is a basic tenet of the medium-
specificity argument: “each medium, like language itself, makes possible a unique mode 
of discourse by providing a new orientation for thought, for expression, for sensibility” 
(Postman 10). This claim, in and of itself, holds no danger: it only becomes problematic 
if the new orientation for thought is considered inadequate or insufficient in comparison 
to the previous orientation. For Postman, this is precisely the case: television is “a 
conversation in images, not words,” and thus deprives its audience of the possibility of 
engaging with complex concepts or philosophical ideas (Postman 7). Without these 
complex concepts or philosophical ideas, Postman fears that public discourse becomes 
“a form of baby talk” (Postman 155). Postman thus lambasts television as being 
responsible for the decline in public discourse, youth education, and waning American 
ability to engage in critical thinking for sustained periods of time.  
My intention here is not to dismiss Postman’s claims wholesale, but rather to 
suggest that his claims about television are founded on an impoverished conception of 
the image cultivated during the media panic surrounding the rise of television. Given 
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Postman’s dedication to the art of reading and his desire for a return to a citizenship that 
is engaged in intellectual and political life, it is understandable that Postman vilifies the 
image, specifically photography. However, when he decries the vapid nature of the 
image, we must keep in mind that he has in his sights the most fragmented and 
spectacle-laden image system to his knowledge – television, not film. We need only 
reference Horkheimer and Adorno in “The Culture Industry” to find a similar argument: 
“the withering of imagination and spontaneity in the consumer of culture” is easily 
traced back to the flickering images on the screen (Horkheimer and Adorno 100). These 
images, Horkheimer and Adorno argue, not only “deny the audience any dimension in 
which they might roam freely in imagination,” they actively “debar the spectator from 
thinking” at all (Horkheimer and Adorno 100). By following this line of argument, both 
theorists enter into an echo chamber of pessimism that does not easily offer an exit – 
unless we revise our theoretical approach to the photographic image, as Adorno did at 
the end of his life. Adorno’s later writings, specifically “Transparencies on Film” and 
Aesthetic Theory, attempt to open a space for the possibility of a political and social 
engagement with film as an art form.
12
 Using those efforts as a guide, a similar 
reevaluation of Postman is necessary. By reorienting Postman towards the photographic 
image, we can open the same space in his argument as Adorno opens in his own: the 
space wherein the viewer can become a reader of a film, and thus experience the same 
critical, intellectual, and political engagement that Postman applauds in the nineteenth-
century reader.  
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Postman’s main claim against images, specifically photography, is that it is only 
capable of presenting particularities: this coffee cup, this dog. Without the aid of 
language, “the photograph does not present to us an idea or concept about the world […] 
it cannot deal with the unseen, the remote, the internal, the abstract” (Postman 72). 
Given the discussion of the Atget photograph in the preceding chapter, we can see that a 
photograph does in fact capture a particularity, but in the same way that an act of naming 
captures a particularity. The photographer, like the linguist, elects a subject for naming, 
and in so doing, elevates it from the amalgamation of experience as specific, relevant, 
and intriguing. This selection does not happen, as Postman argues, as “a dismembering 
of reality, a wrenching of moments out of their contexts,” but as part of a conscious 
decision to preserve, along with the historical context, a sliver of reality (Postman 73). In 
the Atget photograph, the particularity under consideration is the balcony above a 
shoemaker’s shop. The broader conceptual message in the image is not detached from 
the photograph, but is also brought into play: to a viewer familiar with the historical and 
social context of the photograph, the commentary on the rise of the industrial revolution 
and the toll it is taking on artisan crafts is present within the photograph itself. Language 
is not required to elicit that conceptual element – and in the case of the Atget 
photograph, it actually works against the conceptual significance of the image. Rather, 
the careful viewer can find meaning within the photograph as easily as the careful reader 
“struggling with semantic meaning” can elicit conceptual value from a written sentence 
(Postman 50). For a viewer familiar with the social and historical context surrounding 
the photograph, the image really does speak a thousand words. This kind of reading is no 
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different than the knowledge required to understand the social conventions present in a 
nineteenth-century romantic novel, or the evidence of the rise of the wealthy mercantile 
class as seen in fifteenth-century portraiture. Images do maintain conceptual capabilities; 
like any other media, they just require a viewer capable of interpreting them. 
Still, Postman fears that “[any image] can be separated, can be made 
discontinuous, from anything else: all that is necessary is to frame the subject 
differently,” which makes removal from the aforementioned context possible – and with 
it, the removal of any conceptual content (Postman 73). However, I argue that this 
detachment is equally possible with the written word as with images. True, an image can 
be detached from its historical context and manipulated for purposes other than those 
which the artist originally intended. This idea of false representation or obliteration of 
context, however, is not the result of the rise of the image culture. Removing single 
sentences from paragraphs to misrepresent a position and repurposing theses for causes 
antithetical to the original document are centuries-old casualties of the written word. For 
a particularly ironic example, consider the famous seventeenth-century quotation 
attributed to Isaac Newton: “If I have seen further is it by standing on the shoulders of 
giants.” This phrase, now cliché, was adapted from Bernard of Chartres, who is quoted 
by John of Salisbury in the twelfth-century as saying “We are like dwarves on the 
shoulders of giants.”  This detachment from original context and repurposing elsewhere 
is not always negative, as Postman fears, nor is it confined to the realm of image. In 
postmodern theory, this kind of manipulation is not even considered a logical fallacy; it 
becomes pastiche, a way of integrating an artifact without bringing along undesirable 
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historical baggage. Though detachment from context does reduce the conceptual value 
of the original artifact in any medium, it is not confined to moving images, as Postman 
fears. As argued above, it often enables new generations to connect to tradition on their 
own terms, in their own native language. 
Ultimately, Postman is assuming the same aesthetic hierarchy we saw in 
Arnheim: the reader of the text is shrewdly educated, practiced in protracted struggles 
with the written word, while the viewer of the photograph is incapable of anything more 
than a passing glance at a detached and meaningless particularity. As Greenberg notes, 
lobbying for an aesthetic hierarchy requires “an entrance into the politics of taste – to use 
Venturi’s phrase – from which there is no exit” (Greenberg 69). As Postman himself 
concedes, different media permit different modes of engagement; it is not a question of 
better or worse, but simply a difference of kind. Further, all that is required to engage an 
image conceptually is the same kind of training and attention Postman applauds in the 
nineteenth-century American reader:  
The reader must come armed, in a serious state of intellectual readiness. This is 
not easy because he comes to the text alone. In reading, one’s responses are 
isolated, one’s intellect thrown back on its own resources. To be confronted by 
the cold abstractions of printed sentences is to look upon language bare, without 
the assistance of either beauty or community. Thus, reading is by its nature a 
serious business. (Postman 50) 
To the trained eye, photographs and paintings speak of concepts and ideas as much as 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit speaks to a trained philosopher. Postman’s deep 
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concerns about America’s ability to break away from their addiction to the “Now… 
This” way of entertainment may be entirely correct. As he puts it, the challenge is 
pandemic and inescapable: “Americans will not shut down any part of their 
technological apparatus, and to suggest that they do so is to make no suggestion at all” 
(Postman 158). In order to reconcile the need for sustained public engagement in the 
social and political sphere with the fact that Americans have become addicted to the 
fragmented, shallow, and meaninglessness images of television, Postman suggests “the 
solution must be found in how we watch” (Postman 160). To that, I offer a response that 
Postman neglects to consider: the possibility of working to turn today’s generation into 
readers of a different sort: readers of images, specifically in film. By rejecting his 
depiction of all images as necessarily particular, manipulative, and prohibitive of any 
content, we can open the space required to transform film into the role Postman imagines 
only books to hold: “an attempt to make thought permanent and to contribute to the great 
conversation conducted by the authors of the past” (Postman 70). 
 Educating viewers in the critical practice of viewing films is difficult, especially 
given Postman’s apt analysis that most individuals seek to view films for sensation or 
escapism, and thus are practiced at not seeking deeper meaning within them. However, 
the difficulty inherent in seeking meaning in films actually protects the spectator against 
the passivity Benjamin and early Adorno imagine films to possess. As David Jenemann 
argues, any frustration or concentration involved “would provide the irritant against 
which subjectivity could react” and enforce its own reading upon the film (Jenemann 
107). This would then allow the frustrated viewer to cease following the pedantic script 
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of the film, and engage in the “critical deciphering” required when engaging with 
écriture (Hansen 197).  
Hansen arrives at this conclusion by evaluating Horkheimer and Adorno’s early 
claim that “dialectics reveals every image as writing, makes it readable in a language 
that is more than a mere system of signs,” by placing it in conversation with his later – 
and much less condemning – work on film in “Transparencies on Film” (Hansen 196). 
Though Adorno’s later thought “grants cinematic technique the status of aesthetic 
material,” and thus is capable of permitting intellectual, social, and political engagement 
with a work of art, he strictly specifies that this classification only applies to non-
commercial film, such as the American avant-garde movement of the 1930s (Hansen 
190).  
As Horak argues, the first American avant-garde movement was chiefly 
concerned with film itself; the movement’s members viewed themselves “as cineastes, 
as lovers of cinema, as amateurs willing to work in any arena furthering the cause of film 
art, even if it involved commercial productions” (Horak 387). Contrasting this early 
movement with the well-known anti-commercialism and often politically oriented stance 
of the 1950s avant-garde movement, we find that the first practitioners were motivated 
first and foremost by their love of film. This passion generated an entire culture beyond 
the commercialization of Hollywood, producing “a network of exhibition outlets, 
including art theaters, galleries, and amateur film clubs, as well as film publications”; in 
short, a movement (Horak 387). Art houses began showing amateur films, at which 
“director and actors, stimulated by what they had seen in the theater and encouraged by 
  
 50 
the reception of new work, would feel impelled to try their hand” at increasingly 
experimental film in a commercial setting (Horak 391).  
Many of the directors and actors of this movement were not in the film industry 
by trade. The advancement of film technology “allowed every man and woman 
potentially to become a film artist” with innovations leading to cheaper, less complex, 
and more portable cameras and film (Horak 389). In a short perusal of the biographies of 
the major names of this movement, then, we should not be surprised to find painters, 
photographers, medical doctors, sound technicians, and film critics, all of whom were 
able to pursue a passion in film as a result of the much more accessible equipment. The 
1930s movement, unlike the 1950s movement, did not reject the commercial status of 
film wholesale, and accepted financial assistance to pursue their work, wherever it arose. 
As a result, many of the commercially successful directors who had their start in avant-
garde amateur work first worked with documentary film, government-sponsored film, 
and technical work involving scraps of other films, expanding their repertoire beyond the 
traditional Hollywood narrative structure. Thus, the very training of many of the 
directors in Hollywood did not start and end in commercial studios, as when Hitchcock 
learned his subjective camera perspective from observing F. W. Murnau on set.
13
 The 
avant-garde movement not only ran parallel to the films of the 1930s to the 1940s, it 
cross-pollinated, allowing novel techniques to emerge commercially, and commercial 
techniques to receive critique in the esoteric art houses of the avant-garde movement. 
Consider James Sibley Watson’s short film Tomatos Another Day.14 This film 
features amateur actors acting out a script written by a dentist in a one-room set that was 
  
 51 
shot and edited using a personal video camera. The film overtly mocks the overacting 
common in early silent films: the actors move with exaggerated deliberation from one 
stage mark to the next, and they speak their lines slowly and loudly to each other, often 
simply stating the obvious: 
Woman: I have the strangest feeling. 
Husband: What is it? 
Woman: I am no longer alone in this room. 
Husband: Good god! You’re right! Neither am I!15 
This short exchange is a mockery of sorts; Hollywood narratives that rely on overt 
exposition in the dialogue to expound the plot insult the intelligence of the viewer, 
assuming that they could not determine what is happening without such cues. This 
exchange, occurring after the departure of the woman’s secret lover and the return home 
of her husband, is a high parody of this narrative device, delivering the movement of the 
plot to the audience with the subtlety of a sledgehammer. This film further attacks the 
production value of B-movies, especially the sound effects, all of which seem unnatural 
and forced, as when the woman accidentally sits on a wicker hat and produces a 
thunderous crinkling noise. The director, Watson, was a medical doctor by profession, 
but a member of the avant-garde “cineastes” of the 1930s. His motivation to create films 
such as Tomatos Another Day arose, first, out of love for the technical and artistic 
aspects of the cinema. In addition, he created this film out of concern that Hollywood 
was Shanghaiing this nascent art form into becoming a primarily commercial, and thus 
vapid and inelegant, endeavor. At his own expense, he thus produced a film that 
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“ironically comments on the oververbalization of early sound film,” contributing to a 
critical engagement with the development of film as a medium (Hovak 397).  
The avant-garde movement demonstrates an effort to engage in the work of 
crafting films as works of art within a commercial context. Tomatos Another Day, like 
many of the works of the movement, certainly satisfy Adorno’s aesthetic criteria for film 
as art, but they are too esoteric and obscure to pose any real critical attack on the 
Hollywood industry. Similarly, films such as Rose Hobart (1936) are simply too strange 
to attract mass audiences, and the pastiche demonstrated in the collage of scrapped 
footage from East of Borneo (1931) and scientific documentaries would be lost on the 
average Hollywood viewer. Thus, while the strength and influence of the avant-garde 
movement of the 1930s enabled the possibility of critique in Hollywood films, the 
critique must take place in the Hollywood films themselves in order to be successful at 
the level Adorno desires. 
Still, Adorno’s demand for cinema crafted with aesthetic purposes in mind can 
still be found within the Hollywood system – if one only knows where to look. Despite 
his involvement in Hollywood, there is substantial evidence that Adorno cared little 
about the mass produced film, and neglected to consider the possibility that even though 
big-budget films produced by major production companies fell nicely into the 
classifications of the industry, they maintained the possibility for critique within their 
economically maintained parameters.
16
 As Hansen argues, there remains open the 
possibility that a film practiced in the art of “a poverty of means, a self-conscious 
abstinence from perfection, may be more likely to achieve artistic standards of its own” 
  
 53 
(Hansen 190). What are dismissed as aberrations in the paradigm of David Bordwell – 
films that have “subversive moments,” but are not fully subversive films – could perhaps 
be seen as self-consciously abstaining from achieving genre or stylistic perfection in the 
hopes of preserving sociological, artistic, or intellectual meaning. This claim will form 
the basis for the analyses of the films found in Chapter IV. 
In order to sustain this argument, one final component must be included. The 
film of which we now speak cannot retain its ritual component or possibility for 
engagement if performed via a cable television broadcast, fragmented by commercial 
interruptions and edited for content or time. Postman and Benjamin agree that in order to 
fully appreciate the nuanced value of a work of literature, music, painting, or film, the 
work must be permitted to exist as a complete and uninterrupted whole. While this 
analysis of Benjamin rejects the need for an aura surrounding a work of cinema, it does 
rely on a ritualistic space in which meaning can emerge, and to sustain this, the 
performance must remain uninterrupted. Without granting the work the opportunity to 
exist in its fullness, nothing of its truth, beauty, or critical commentary can emerge. In 
the same way, we must make the distinction that film can only be appreciated in its 
fullest form when it is viewed continuously, without distraction, in either the cathedral of 
the theater or the home altar of the living room. 
The issue is not simply the distraction offered by the commercial interruptions; I 
argue that playing a film during a cable broadcast amounts to a translation from its 
original language. Most film auteurs design their films to be viewed on the forty-foot 
screen; mimicking the same performance to the 42” screen amounts to a mere difference 
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of degree. However, embedding Casablanca (1942) within a “Now… This” presentation 
so that Rick’s poignant comment to Ilsa, “We’ll always have Paris” is immediately 
followed by a brightly colored toothpaste advertisement is a translation in which the 
original meaning is not just lost, but destroyed.
17
 It is a difference of kind. Just as a 
translation of poetry from one language to another results in “a rough idea of the sense 
of the poem,” but loses “especially that which makes it an object of beauty,” placing a 
film within the context of television gives the viewer a rough sense of the film, but runs 
the risk of losing everything that makes it an object of beauty, truth, and meaning 
(Postman 117).  
This gives viewers an option: either enter the space of the cathedral of the 
theater, or seize the opportunity offered by the technologies of DVD players, streaming 
video, and digital copies of the film to engage with the ritual in a private space. In 
reference to Postman’s justified concerns about the decline of intellectualism, the 
accessibility to this experience granted by these technologies is, for many individuals, 
more available and much more preferable than reading a book. Again, film is not an 
either/or between entertainment and enchantment: as long as we approach the medium in 
the appropriate ways, we can “[endow] it with magic,” and thus “gain access to 
sacredness” in the entertainment and engagement of watching a film (Postman 122). 
Film is now poised to rise to the apex Postman imagined possible for any aesthetic 
medium: “it sometimes has the power to become implicated in our concepts of piety, or 
goodness, or beauty[;] and it is always implicated in the way we define and regulate our 
ideas of truth” (Postman 18).  
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As an educator, I must include the fact that reading both Bloom and Postman is 
compelling. When my students read Amusing Ourselves to Death, they describe their 
own experiences with television as fragmented, meaningless, and manipulative. All the 
same, they feel powerless to break away from it – assuming that they even consider the 
idea of breaking away as a plausible request. At the beginning of each semester, I ask 
my students the same questions Bloom asked his, and continue to experience similar 
results: most students do not have a book that “really counts” for them, nor do they have 
developed concepts of heroism or evil. These experiences I share with Postman and 
Bloom are disconcerting, and their attacks on television and film are thus compelling – 
at least at face value. More compelling, however, is the necessity to follow Bloom in his 
command that “education in our times must try to find whatever there is in students that 
might yearn for completion, and to reconstruct the learning that would enable them 
autonomously to seek that completion” (Bloom 63). Students, I think, yearn for a 
connection to the objective reality of their times; film, I argue, can give that to them. 
Thus, we have arrived at a position to consider the films themselves as écriture available 
for engagement in the ritualistic space of viewing a film. The concerns of Postman, 
Bloom, and Horkheimer and Adorno still pose a strong threat to cinema as possible 
avenues for artistic, sociological, and political engagement with the modern world, but 
there is now open the possibility that some films contain within them critical 
commentary about the medium, industry, and social importance of cinema related to “the 
objective spirit of its time” (Adorno 205). If this is the case, then a pedagogical project 
geared at allowing students the opportunity to seek out this meaning is necessary if we 
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are to take Bloom and Postman seriously. In the next chapter, formal, stylistic, and 
theoretical analyses of numerous commercial films will seek to demonstrate a non-ironic 
interpretation of Adorno’s statement: “how nice it would be if, under the present 
circumstances, one could claim that the less films appear to be works of art, the more 
they would be just that” (Adorno 205). As I will argue, we can find these films present in 
the classical Hollywood era as easily as in the post-modern era. The next chapter will 
draw explicit connections between the complicitous critique found in classical 
Hollywood films and the complicitous critique found in postmodern films. Reading 
these films as complicitous critique allows us to see them as representing deeper 
philosophical, artistic, and sociological meanings. Further, discovering those meanings 
for self-development, critical thought, and intellectual growth is simply a matter of 
learning how to read the meaning within the films. 
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NOTES
                                                 
     
7
 For a discussion of the social ramifications of digital social media, see Naomi 
Baron’s Always On. For a consideration of the way in which digital communications 
impacts ethical development, see the work of Shannon Vallor, especially “Social 
Networking Technology and the Virtues.”  
     
8
 For notable scholars in this field, see Stanely Cavell, The World Viewed (1971), 
Gilles Deleuze, Cinema I (1983) and Cinema II (1985), and Kathryn Thompson-Jones, 
Aesthetics and Film (2008). 
     
9
 Media panic is first cited in “J. Young, “The role of the police as amplifiers of 
deviance,” in Images of Deviance. 
     
10
 See Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media. For an analysis of McLuhan from 
the framework of the digital age, see Robert K. Logan’s Understanding New Media: 
Extending Marshall McLuhan. 
     
11
 For this larger argument, see the work of Dan Conway. 
     
12
 See Miriam Hansen’s work for an extensive analysis of the way in which Adorno 
reorients his thoughts about film in his later writings. 
     
13
 For this and other anecdotes about the connection between Hitchcock and Murnau, 
see James Bade’s “Murnau’s The Last Laugh and Hitchcock’s Subjective Camera.” 
     
14
 For other films from this movement, see Joseph Cornell’s Rose Hobart (1936), 
Emlen Etting’s Poem 8 (1932), and the work of Mary Ellen Bute such as Synchronomy 
No. 2 (1936) and Escape (1938).  
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15
 All dialogue quoted from this film are subtitles from the DVD. Avant-Garde 3: 
Experimental Cinema, 1922-1954. New York: Kino, 2009. 
     
16
 For an excellent analysis of the extent of Adorno’s personal engagement with 
Hollywood during his time in California, see David Jenemann’s full article “Below the 
Surface: Frankfurt Goes to Hollywood.” 
17
 All dialogue quoted from this film are subtitles from the DVD. Casablanca. Dir. 
Michael Curtiz. 1942. Warner Brothers, 2012. DVD. 
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CHAPTER IV 
COMPLICITOUS CRITIQUE, A HOLLYWOOD TRADITION 
 
This chapter will draw on the theoretical considerations put forth in the preceding 
two chapters and explore the formal, narrative, stylistic, and intellectual qualities of 
films that are (a) consciously aware of their status as manifestations of a medium that is 
capable of producing art, (b) commercially successful, and (c) extend an invitation to 
viewers to enter into an existential consideration of the presence or creation of truth in 
their daily lives. Following the arguments set forth thus far, these three considerations 
must be met in this chapter in order to justify the orientation towards film I wish to offer.  
First, following Chapter II, the films in this section must be medium self-
conscious: they must be aware that while their commercial task is to entertain, they also 
must engage in an active dialogue with and advancement of the conventions and 
expansions of film as a medium. Second, contra Adorno, these films cannot be esoteric 
art films accessible only to the few; if Bloom and Postman are to be taken seriously, they 
must be films that have shown wide audience appeal, and thus invite viewers to 
participate in their content. Finally, these films must contain an element of complicitous 
critique that is strong enough to encourage select viewers to engage with them in a 
serious, contemplative, and existential manner, yet subtle enough that it does not stray 
too far from the standard formula, and, as Lessing cautions, frustrates the viewer from 
identifying any truth or meaning. 
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To begin this analysis, we will consider several films from the Hollywood 
Classical era. Developed analyses of Sullivan’s Travels (Sturges 1941), A Star Is Born 
(Wellman 1937), and Citizen Kane (Welles 1941) will provide evidence of complicitous 
critique within each film. Finally, in order to demonstrate the persistence of complicitous 
critique from the classical era to the postmodern era, I will provide connections to 
several contemporary films: Fargo (The Coen Brothers 1996), O Brother Where Art 
Thou (The Coen Brothers 2000), Adaptation (Jonze 2002), Burn After Reading (The 
Coen Brothers 2008), and Inception (Nolan 2010). 
Of specific interest will be the way in which these films challenge (a) the 
commercial production of films (Sullivan’s Travels, A Star Is Born), (b) the tendency to 
offer neat conclusions for complex problems (Sullivan’s Travels, Citizen Kane, 
Inception, Fargo, Burn After Reading, Adaptation), (c) the inability to escape fabricated 
narratives (Sullivan’s Travels, A Star is Born, Citizen Kane, The Bad and the Beautiful, 
O Brother Where Art Thou), (d) our own attraction to spectacle and escapism (The 
Crowd, Inception). 
 
IV.1. Sullivan’s Travels and the Critique of the Hollywood Machine 
Sullivan’s Travels is read in today’s literature as a screwball comedy; while it is 
perhaps a bit more “offbeat” than the screwball comedies of Capra, it is only quietly 
heralded as a highly irreverent critique of classical style (Schatz 109). While the film is 
included in most scholarly works considering Hollywood work in that era, dedicated 
work on the film as a unique moment is sparse.
18
 The absence of scholarship centering 
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on the film is curious, considering that the New York Times 1941 review hails the film as 
a “beautifully trenchant satire upon ‘social significance’ in pictures, a stinging slap at 
those fellows who howl for realism on the screen and a deftly sardonic apologia for 
Hollywood make-believe” (Crowther). It is not purely the content of the film that allows 
the careful viewer to arrive at such a conclusion. As will be argued, the formal structure 
of the film, narrative impetus, use of comedy, and fabricated happy ending all call into 
question the conventions of classical film while remaining well within its parameters. 
This film does more than simply “lay bare the device” (Bordwell 22) of making a film, a 
mere comedic strategy for Bordwell. Rather, it consciously raises the question of film’s 
ability to simultaneously offer an escape from the challenges of daily life and make a 
political, sociological, and artistic statement. 
An early scene immediately demonstrates the “satire” at work in the film: famous 
director John Sullivan (Joel McCrea) complains to his producers that he wishes to make 
a change in his artistic vision. The kinds of film for which he has become famous are 
spectacle films, geared towards mass consumption, typified by our glimpses of one of 
his films in the opening scene: a daring hand-to-hand battle, a speeding train, a dramatic 
explosion.  
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Figure 5: Sullivan’s Travels. Dir. Preston Sturges. 1941. Criterion Collection, 2001. DVD.  
Sully wants to expose the “sociological and artistic dimensions of film as an art form!” 
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What Sullivan instead wishes to accomplish is expressed in a brilliant speech 
only a few minutes into the first act (Figure 5): 
Sullivan: I wanted to make you something outstanding, something you could be 
proud of, something that would realize the potentialities of film as the 
sociological and artistic medium that it is – with a little sex in it. 
 LeBrand: Something like Capra. 
 Sullivan: What’s wrong with Capra?19 
Though this dialogue is delivered in rapid, almost slapstick form, the question it raises is 
deep and important, and of particular interest to Hollywood during the late 1930s and 
prewar 1940s. As has been argued, this period was the golden era of the studio system, a 
time when films were produced according to strict narrative formulas, actors were cast 
according to types, and the most important component in the motion picture industry 
was the profit. Sullivan’s desire to escape this system, like Capra’s, mirrors the rise in 
amateur cinematography in the 1930s: film produced as a labor of love rather than 
purely for profit. 
Frank Capra took this task seriously: he devoted his efforts to make film into “a 
sociological and artistic medium,” by striving to unify the audience’s desire for escapism 
with their own felt responsibility for social action. As Capra mentions in his 
bibliography, films were able to “talk to hundreds of millions, for two hours – and in the 
dark,” presenting a prime opportunity for spreading social and political awareness 
(Moran 112). Though McBride notes that this story is likely a fabrication, Capra felt the 
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need to resist profit-driven escapism to the extent that almost all of his films after It 
Happened One Night (1934) present a strong social, political, or ethical component.  
 Rather than join this trend by producing his own version of Mr. Smith Goes to 
Washington (Capra 1939), Preston Sturges elects a subtler approach. Sullivan’s Travels 
mocks such high-minded aspirations by juxtaposing a caricature of “motion picture 
producers whose notion of art is a little sex,” LeBrand, with a comically naïve director 
seeking to change the world, Sullivan (Crowther). Even in this opening scene, we can 
see that Sturges is doing more than “holding a mirror up to reality” – he is holding a 
mirror up to the attempt to hold a mirror up to reality. 
 Despite this mockery, then, Sullivan’s Travels does not simply make fun of films 
with messages; it also raises the same question: is it possible for films to “say 
something” to their viewers, or is it merely a medium of entertainment? Sullivan’s drive 
to create O Brother Where Art Thou is the Benjaminian demand that film should offer 
viewers activation and awareness: Sullivan, like Benjamin, wishes to create a direct and 
unavoidable engagement with a social, historical, or political situation. Unlike Sullivan 
and Benjamin, Sullivan’s Travels itself sees the error of such a blunt approach, and 
engages in a critique much more subtly.  
Helpful here is Moran and Rogin’s interpretation of the film with a particular 
emphasis on its relation to the Popular Front: one of the ways that Sturges uniquely 
enters this discussion is by “understanding the political as an angle of vision rather than 
an agenda for action” (Moran 110). Though the ultimate moral of Sullivan’s Travels is to 
give people comedy and thus help them escape their troubles, the film has allowed us to 
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glimpse the particular problematic of Hollywood’s attempt to serve as a mirror for 
reality by reflecting and recording this very effort. As in A Star is Born, the “glittering, 
tinseled, trivial, generous, cruel and ecstatic world that is Hollywood” is exposed as so 
well fabricated that it is capable of deceiving not only its consumers but also its 
producers (“A Star is Born” 1937). Both Sully and Vicki lose sight of the boundaries of 
Hollywood to the point that they become lost – figuratively, in Vicki’s sense, and 
literally, in Sully’s. The second act of Sullivan’s Travels contains a series of narratives in 
which no matter how Sully tries he cannot seem to get away from Hollywood, 
metaphorically suggesting that such an escape, if possible, is always temporary and 
futile. The Aristotelian realism venerated by Bordwell is thus problematized: the 
possible production of O Brother Where Art Thou may be realist, but unless Sully can 
escape Hollywood, the reality it will project is an always-already fabricated narrative of 
what Hollywood believes reality to be.  
In “The Culture Industry,” Horkheimer and Adorno argue that for those 
acclimated to film, “life is made indistinguishable from the sound film”; in Sullivan’s 
Travels, Sullivan experiences this to an exaggerated extent (Horkheimer and Adorno 
99). Sullivan repeatedly displays “the familiar experience of the moviegoer, who 
perceives the street outside as a continuation of the film he has just left,” except that his 
experience cycles through a series of “rigid invariants” of formulas for screwball 
adventures (Horkheimer and Adorno 99). Sullivan’s Travels dramatizes the 
encroachment of Hollywood reality upon actual reality in these scenes, demonstrating 
the impossibility of escaping the fabrication of reality under the culture industry. In so 
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doing, it calls explicit attention to this phenomenon, depicting the potential for “those 
exposed to [film] to identify film directly with reality” as comically absurd – thus 
robbing it of its power in a Bergsonian sense (Horkheimer and Adorno 99).  
Of particular interest about this trope is its relative anachronism in film history. 
This critique of the power of Hollywood to accurately display reality is commonly 
understood as beginning in postmodern film, as argued by Linda Hutcheon. Certainly, 
Sullivan’s Travels seems perfectly at home within the oeuvre of Joel and Ethan Coen, 
the filmmakers that actually succeeded in making O Brother Where Art Thou – as a 
comedy, in 2000. Like Sturges, the Coen Brothers’ films address serious topics with 
irreverent, dark humor: murder is discussed flippantly in Fargo (1996), government 
espionage is mocked in Burn After Reading (2008), and O Brother Where Art Though 
(2000) offers a comedic look at the Great Depression. 
In each of these films, we can find the same tension between the status of film as 
entertainment and film as socially or morally instructive that we see in Sullivan’s 
Travels. Importantly, they also share the addition of an overt placement of a moral at the 
conclusion of each film, one that often starkly contrasts with the atmosphere of the rest 
of the film. Fargo is a dark crime thriller featuring a plucky pregnant sheriff (Frances 
McDormand) attempting to solve the murder of a highway patrolman and locate a 
kidnapped housewife – whose kidnapping, it turns out, was orchestrated by mild-
mannered husband Jerry Lundegaard (William H. Macy) as a scheme to make money. 
Once the crime has been solved, Marge offers us a moral in the form of a cliché, “there’s 
more to life than a little money, ya know,” which is a strangely Pollyanna conclusion to 
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a violent and dark film.
20
 In Burn After Reading, a film about government espionage, 
multiple accounts of murder, and blackmail, the concluding scene, a conversation 
between the two CIA Superiors, mocks the entire idea of a moral: 
CIA Superior: “What did we learn, Palmer?” 
CIA Officer: “I don’t know, sir.” 
CIA Superior: “I don’t fuckin’ know either. I guess we learned not to do it 
again.” 
 CIA Officer: “Yes, sir.” 
 CIA Superior: “I’m fucked if I know what we did.” 
 CIA Officer: “Yes, sir, it’s, uh, very difficult to say.”21 
By remaining within the formula for a happy ending, the film offers a moral while 
simultaneously calling into question the validity and the artistic appropriateness of 
offering a moral in a film at all. Less subtly, the mockery of a happy ending to A Star is 
Born finds the newly widowed Vicki attempting to make a bold declaration of her 
independence from studio manipulation by rejecting her stage name in favor of 
announcing herself as “Mrs. Norman Maine.”22 This would have been a touching tribute 
to her late husband had she used his given name, Hinkle, but in using his stage name in 
place of her own, this happy ending reveals itself to be an easily missed depiction of her 
continued naiveté about the studio system. Even though she is the one who “[drew] the 
winning lot,” she finds herself trapped in a false identity, joining her fans as they 
“rejoice in the good fortune of someone else, who might just as well be oneself” – 
especially as Esther Blodgett is completely lost to her (Horkheimer and Adorno 116). In 
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this one statement, Vicki neé Esther presents herself as remaining as much in the 
shadows about her own position in the studio system as she has been stylistically 
throughout the early portions of the film (Figure 6) – she is not a liberated woman, free 
to make her own choices, but is trapped in a system she never fully understood. 
Importantly, those who wish to read the conclusions to Burn After Reading, Fargo, or A 
Star is Born passively may do so; but those who wish to look deeper will find harsh 
critiques of the desire for neat conclusions and easy morals. 
 Similarly, Sullivan’s Travels offers a rather sentimental and pious moral: that 
“comedy is all that some people have” (Figure 7). This moral may work for an audience 
member seeking escapism, but it places them in an inferior position to the Hollywood 
executive graciously granting them reprieve from their miserable lives. This is found in 
the scene in the prison theater: at this point, Sully is one of the masses whose only hope 
is comedy, but the inevitable movement of the narrative removes him from the situation 
soon enough. His narrative loop is perhaps best described by Moran and Rogin as “self-
reflexive entrapment,” given that his personal growth has been nothing more than 
acceptance of his task to make comedies for the people – the goal of the studio director 
and the producer the entire time (113). 
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Figure 6: A Star is Born. Dir. William A. Wellman. 1937. Kino, 2012. DVD.  
Esther shown in shadow, demonstrative of her inability to understand her role in the Hollywood 
system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Sullivan’s Travels. Dir. Preston Sturges. 1941. Criterion Collection, 2001. DVD.  
Sully realizes that he wants to make comedy, to give the people what they want. 
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In this way, Sully’s acceptance of his place in Hollywood is as deluded as Vicki’s; his 
identity is just as preselected. Considered from this perspective, Sullivan’s Travels has 
the same weight of a moral as Burn After Reading: whatever you are doing, make sure 
that it lacks any loose ends that might distract the general public from Bordwell’s 
“American values” working their influence (Figure 8). This is a critique on not only the 
ability for Hollywood to present an accurate representation of reality, but more 
importantly, its desire to do so. Art for art’s sake, from which Sully flees, and towards 
which he ultimately arrives, is presented in this film not as the “mindless artistry, which 
represents what is human against the social mechanism,” but as the ultimate balm for 
those crushed within the social mechanism (Horkheimer and Adorno 114). While an 
early review faults the film because “Sullivan should have been more affected by his 
experience than he seems to be,” this failure to fully appreciate his own position actually 
heightens the critique of the medium within the film (Crowther). Sully is so shocked by 
the glimpse behind the wizard’s curtain that he must cling to the apparatus that protects 
him from a full understanding of the world. In Sully’s own forced contentment at the 
conclusion of the film, we can glimpse our own desperate need for safety and security 
reflected back to us.  
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Figure 8: Burn After Reading. Dir. The Coen Brothers. 2008. Universal Studios Home 
Entertainment, 2008. DVD. Don’t do it again, even if we don’t know what “it” is. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Sullivan’s Travels. Dir. Preston Sturges. 1941. Criterion Collection, 2001. DVD.  
Sully laughs, despite himself. 
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 In this way we can see both the contentment of Sully and the laughter of the 
prisoners (Figure 9) in the way that Horkheimer and Adorno see it, as “a parody of 
humanity [whose] harmony is a caricature of solidarity” (Horkheimer and Adorno 112). 
It is “wrong laughter” which “copes with fear by defecting to the agencies which inspire 
it,” just as Sullivan defects to his place amongst those agents at the conclusion of the 
film (Horkheimer and Adorno 112). Whereas Capra devoted his life to making films that 
would expose and thus ameliorate social ills, Sturges allows this film to consider the 
alternative, creating comedy not because “that’s all some people have,” but because it is 
all some people want. What Sully gains in his travels is the security in knowing that the 
“even more disturbing loss, the deprivation of Hollywood itself” is assuredly not going 
to happen as long as the audience, like the prisoners, keep filing into the theater (Moran 
112). Sully spent most of the film trying to escape Hollywood, and when he finally 
needed to go back to it, it was always there, ready to welcome him into the warm 
embrace of an anonymous audience, joined together in the appearance of brotherhood 
and solidarity (Figure 10).  
 We must consider what kind of message this film offers readers, if at least on an 
unconscious level. If the film cannot hold up a mirror to the reality of Depression era 
America, for fear that the image may be too real, it can offer another glimpse into the 
mirror: our own faces, desperately seeking a distraction.  
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Figure 10: Sullivan’s Travels. Dir. Preston Sturges. 1941. Criterion Collection, 2001. DVD. 
Sully becomes one of the crowd, safe in his blank laughter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 74 
 
Figure 11: Fargo. Dir. The Coen Brothers. 1996. Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 2005. DVD.  
An image behind a screen within an image frustrates this moral. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12: O Brother Where Art Thou. Dir. The Coen Brothers. 2000. Touchstone Home Video, 
2001. DVD. The audience, like the girls, is strung along by the narrative. 
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This tactic is strongly contrary to the classical style, which seeks at every turn to cover 
over the activity of fabrication and illusion. Further, what is reflected is as bleak a visage 
as the dénouement of Fargo: Graer Grimsrud reflected in the rearview mirror, separated 
from us by the screen of the cop car, on display as one who mistook reality for a farce 
(Figure 11). It is echoed in the final shot of O Brother Where Art Thou, where Everett’s 
many daughters are dragged behind their parents on a string, jerked forward in the next 
misadventure of the family (Figure 12). The children, like the audience, must continue 
forward in the narrative, forbidden to stop and glance at the operation of the medium at 
work, metaphorically represented here as the sole push cart operator, a deus ex machina 
on rails (Figure 13). All of these echo the famous scene which began this trope, the 
ending scene of King Vidor’s The Crowd (1928) in which a theater of mindlessly 
laughing patrons enlarges almost to an impossible extent (Figure 14), lost in the mass of 
their own “medicinal” amusement (Horkheimer and Adorno 112).  
As Lawrence Levine argues, while Sullivan’s Travels offers a trite conclusion to 
an infinitely complex issue, “no final ending, no ultimate apologia could automatically 
erase the images of misery, despair, and hopelessness the film made available to the 
audience” (Levine 1391). A convenient happy ending cannot erase the images of the 
vignette in which Sullivan and The Girl wander through the hopeless victims of the 
Great Depression; the film thus has two possibilities for the viewer: “comedy is all some 
people have,” and this is what the Great Depression looks like.  
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Figure 13: O Brother Where Art Thou. Dir. The Coen Brothers. 2000. Touchstone Home Video, 
2001. DVD. If one of the audience stops to consider the apparatus of the film, she is jerked back 
into line by the invisible narrative thread. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 14: The Crowd. Dir. King Vidor. 1928. MGM/UA Home Video, 1989. Videocassette. 
The audience reflected back to itself. 
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In the same way, the Pollyanna conclusion to Fargo cannot erase the horrific 
images of Graer Grimsrud running his associate through a woodcutter. The film asserts 
these images as forcefully as it covers them over with narrative conventions and glib 
dialogue. 
 What is at work in Sullivan’s Travels is a conscious challenging of the idea of 
film as possessing one reading, and thus, one goal: either education, or entertainment, or 
art, or commercialism. Sturges manages to accomplish this critique without deviating 
from the formally classical mode of cinema, and thus offers a critique disguised as 
comedy: comfortable, familiar, sellable, and effective. Reading the film in this way, as 
an “open text” opposed to the classical trope of screwball comedy, allows us to consider 
the way in which the “subversive moments” of classical cinema need not deviate from 
conventions in order to challenge them (Bordwell 81).
23
 
 
IV.2. Citizen Kane and the Fabrication of Filmic Truth 
The above analysis of Sullivan’s Travels seeks to consider the ways in which 
critique can be offered within a conventional narrative, characterization, and plot 
structure. In this section, I will consider the way in which Citizen Kane challenges the 
status of narrative authority within a film by deploying technical, structural, and 
cinematographic strategies that present a coherent and fluid narrative while calling 
attention to the fabrication of filmic truth. 
 The overt problem in Citizen Kane, the identity of Charles Foster Kane, is trite 
enough to be found in any film textbook, and easily enough summarized: “Kane’s 
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identity is complex… he is an enigma to the end, merely the retrieved and filtered 
memories of those who knew him or thought they knew him” (Simmons 138). The 
classical reading of Citizen Kane is as a film questioning the status of identity, of 
depicting the struggle to remember a man through the impact he left on the world as well 
as the people in it. The deep-focus cinematography of the film allows this important 
question to appear to the audience almost unencumbered. No mediation of a dialogue in 
the form of a shot-reverse-shot frustrates the viewer’s access to the minutest facial cue, 
and plot progression can take place in a “depth of focus [that] brings the spectator into a 
relation with the image closer to that which he enjoys with reality” (Bazin 35). For 
Bazin, this filmic structure belies a greater sense of truth at work in the film; just as Mr. 
Thompson explores every available avenue to determine the meaning of Kane’s last 
words, Citizen Kane “is not trying to deceive us,” but “condensing time” so that we 
might explore the truth of the scene ourselves (Bazin 36). The film does not simply tell 
us about Kane’s character or legacy, but encourages us to explore the matter at our 
leisure. 
 From the moment that Kane’s snow globe shatters on the floor beside his 
deathbed, the film invites us to share in the recreation of the components of his life, to 
make it as whole and transparent as the beloved trinket. At least six narrative frames 
contrive to reproduce Kane’s life: a newsreel obituary that gives an allegedly objective 
viewpoint of Kane’s life; the journey of Mr. Thompson in his pursuit of the truth behind 
Rosebud and thus Kane; the several smaller narrative frames in the form of recollections 
and flashbacks initiated by other characters. There are also two sequences which place 
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the viewer in a “privileged, omniscient” position that are enframed by only the film 
itself: the opening scene of Xanadu, leading into Kane’s death, and the closing scene 
featuring the destruction of Rosebud and our departure from Xanadu (Fabe 81). As has 
been argued by numerous scholars, each of these frames suggests the inadequacy of 
authorship in its own way, and thus the film relies upon the viewer’s ability to construct 
meaning out of a haphazard collection of parts. By way of assistance, the six narrators 
provide increasingly relevant information until the conclusion of the film “reveals the 
final missing piece” and solves the riddle of Kane’s life (Fabe 83). Though this narrative 
device is noted as being “unusual and original to films,” and does not rest comfortably 
within the narrative structure described by Bordwell, it retains familiarity as it is “a 
narrative technique not infrequently employed by novelists” (“Citizen Kane” 2 May 
1941). As a result, the narrative structure is novel, but not so disarming that it shirks 
convention; it is able to excite its viewers without hardening them against it. 
 Beyond this, the film criticizes the validity of authority and truth not just in 
Citizen Kane, but in any filmic text. This also classic reading seeks to consider the way 
in which the juxtaposition of the frames of the film is organized to place their validity in 
conflict with each other. For instance, the absence of sentiment in the newsreel, or the 
clouding of anger, guilt, narcissism, and idolization from each of the personal narratives 
is made more apparent by the need to continually move to the next narrative for more 
information. It is not solely the individual narrative’s inability to explain Kane’s last 
word that comes to the forefront in this movement, but also the personal bias clouding 
the trustworthiness of the narrative. The incompleteness of each narrative taken together 
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at once forces the viewer to make, not receive, a judgment about Kane, and works to 
problematize any conclusion that can be surmised. Not only is there no final truth 
presented in the film, but each piece of the puzzle is shown to be warped; this film not 
only refuses to provide satisfactory explanations, but it challenges the very conditions of 
the possibility of those explanations.  
 The use of flashbacks to unfold the narrative is not “a long outdated arty 
custom,” but rather the entire driving force of Citizen Kane as well as The Bad and the 
Beautiful (Minnelli 1952). Adorno critiques the overuse of flashbacks, claiming that 
“these techniques are not grounded in the necessities of the individual works but in mere 
convention; they inform the viewer as to what is being signified or what needs to be 
added in order to comprehend whatever escapes basic cinematic realism” (Adorno 204). 
However, divagations in these two films are not misleading, divergent from the story, or 
tactless conventions employed to cover over the anticipated ignorance of the audience. 
Rather, they form the basis of both plots: it is through flashbacks and interventions in 
what would otherwise be two weak main plots that the main goal of each film is realized. 
Flashbacks and superimpositions are the means through which each film is actualized. 
Without them, Citizen Kane is a film about a reporter failing to make an adequate 
obituary, and The Bad and the Beautiful is a film about three individuals agreeing to sign 
another production contract – both immensely shallow storylines lacking any of the 
critical acclaim the two films have received. The use of flashbacks is not as dramatic 
fluff, but as a tactical and critical use to demonstrate the manipulation of filmic identity 
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in film itself. The story unfolds as the film determines it to unfold – and not according to 
any predetermined convention, as in a mystery or drama. 
 Further, the structure, sequencing, and shot construction of Citizen Kane all 
challenge the validity within film as a medium. Let us consider the first narrator at work, 
the newsreel, which does not announce the death of Charles Foster Kane until several 
minutes into the sequences – it first announces the death of “Xanadu’s Landlord” (Figure 
15). While it is true, as one of the reporters notes, that “70 years of a man’s life – that’s a 
lot to try to get into a newsreel,” it might be supposed that five minutes into the newsreel 
is suspiciously long to omit any full photo of the deceased (Figure 16).  
While these omissions immediately call into question the identity of Kane, they 
further call into question the authorial authority to speak about whatever identity Kane 
might possess as a character on screen. The newsreel created to commemorate Kane 
gives us a heavily stylized, seemingly objective, and well-documented perspective of his 
life. Polished as it is, we might be tempted to adopt it as truth if we were not 
immediately told to reject it by the lead reporter. This propels some viewers forward in 
the narrative, searching for the “something juicier” mentioned by the reporters, but it 
also permits some viewers to pause and consider the way in which any two-dimensional 
representation of an individual, regardless of how deeply or realistically it is shot, will 
fail to appear in its full truth.
24
  
 
  
 82 
 
Figure 15: Citizen Kane. Dir. Orson Welles. 1941. Warner Home Video, 2001. DVD.  
Obituary notice which omits the name Charles Foster Kane completely. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Citizen Kane. Dir. Orson Welles. 1941. Warner Home Video, 2001. DVD.  
The first mention of the title character, without an embodied image. 
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Figure 17: Citizen Kane. Dir. Orson Welles. 1941. Warner Home Video, 2001. DVD.  
The opening of the newsreel, presented as part of the film itself. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18: Citizen Kane. Dir. Orson Welles. 1941. Warner Home Video, 2001. DVD.  
Side shot of conclusion of newsreel, the traces of the apparatus highlighted by cigarette smoke. 
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The formal fabrication of this frame is overt and repeatedly signified. The sequence 
features visual bookends – the title of the newsreel (Figure 17) and the side shot of the 
end of the newsreel, from the perspective of the viewing room (Figure 18) – that jar the 
viewer into the realization that this section of the film stands apart from the larger 
narrative. Like Sullivan’s Travels, the inclusion of a film-within-a-film immediately 
draws attention to the operation of the medium itself instead of allowing the viewer to 
simply sink into a story. 
Further, it draws our attention to the ability of a medium to present truth to the 
viewer. This important scene in the living room was carefully constructed by Gregg 
Toland to metaphorically represent the possession or absence of truth. As noted by 
Phillip Cowan, “Toland explores many techniques which symbolized or represented the 
narrative in some way”; for instance, “some of his characters move from shadow into the 
light when they reveal the truth about themselves” (Cowan 88). In the viewing room, 
Thompson remains in the dark, silhouetted against the stark light of the truth of the 
rejected newsreel (Figure 19). Continuing this trope, Thompson performs his research 
with his back to the camera, obscuring his importance as anything other than another 
camera through which we can observe the stories available to us from Thatcher (George 
Coulouis), Bernstein (Everett Sloane), Leland (Joseph Cotton), Susan (Dorothy 
Comingore), and Raymond (Paul Stewart). In each search for truth, Thompson fades 
away (Figure 20) and allows individual perspectives to offer a narratively cohesive, but 
deceptively incomplete, recreation of Kane’s life. It is not Thompson’s truth we wish to 
come to light, but Kane’s – and this movement never happens within this larger frame.  
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Figure 19: Citizen Kane. Dir. Orson Welles. 1941. Warner Home Video, 2001. DVD.  
Thompson in dark relief, suggestive of his inability to step into the truth of Kane. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: Citizen Kane. Dir. Orson Welles. 1941. Warner Home Video, 2001. DVD.  
Susan’s recollection of Kane, notable due to Thompson’s presence in heavy darkness. 
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Kane’s life is never presented to the viewer-in-and-of-itself, in any objective sense. It is 
always mediated by the “inescapable subjectivity” of one of the narrative frames, and 
thus, according to Bazin, is able to be called into question in the same way that the 
newsreel is immediately rejected as inadequate or incomplete (Bazin 12). 
 At the same time, the film does not overtly call these individual narratives into 
question. As their interjection into the overall narrative takes the form of flashbacks, and 
not overtly fabricated narratives like the newsreel, the audience is invited to explore 
these perspectives on Kane’s life and take them at face value. Though fragmented from 
each other, they fit nicely into a series of narrative flashbacks, comfortably moving 
together towards a singular goal. The same structure is at work in The Bad and the 
Beautiful, which features a series of vignettes explaining the complicated history of an 
industry savant seeking redemption after a fall from grace. As in Kane, the identity of 
Jonathan Shields is not revealed until the first flashback of the film: before that, he is 
only identified as an infamous character by the fact that three characters refuse to take 
his phone calls or work with him again. The flashback sequences in The Bad and the 
Beautiful are similarly bookended by references to the operation of the medium, this 
time by a slow transition from a close up on an Oscar statue (Figure 21). Unlike Kane, 
Shields never appears in real-time in the film; he only ever appears in flashbacks, thus 
deepening the question of his identity, as well as the ability to speak, filmically, about 
his identity.  
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Figure 21: The Bad and the Beautiful. Dir. Vincente Minnelli. 1952. Warner Brothers, 2002. 
DVD. Jonathan Shields introduced via a superimposition of his figure and an Oscar statue, thus 
placing him in direct relationship with the industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: The Bad and the Beautiful. Dir. Vincente Minnelli. 1952. Warner Brothers, 2002. 
DVD. Jonathan Shields demonstrating control over the picture by limiting the spectator’s range 
of visibility. 
  
 88 
One scene in particular makes a clear reference to Toland’s motif of the light of truth: in 
a darkened viewing room, Jonathan Shields places only his hand under the light of the 
projector, indicating the power the camera has not only to present truth, but to obscure it 
(Figure 22). The camera does show us a variety of Kanes and Shields, each tinted by the 
memory of the narrator guiding the flashback, but it also obscures the Cat Man in order 
to hide the poor costuming and low budget. In both cases, the audience experiences the 
desired effect without seeing anything real: in The Bad and the Beautiful they fear the 
imagined, but not seen Cat Man, and in Citizen Kane they understand the fabricated, but 
not shown, Kane.  
 Deepening this larger structural and formal critique in Citizen Kane are a series 
of visual and vocal cues within individual narratives suggesting Kane’s fragmented 
character. Thatcher’s narrative recalls a conversation in which Kane declares, “trouble is 
you don’t realize that you’re talking to two people” (Figure 23). This trope of 
multiplicity is repeated again in Raymond’s narrative, in which we are permitted to 
witness Kane walking past first one mirror, then between two gigantic mirrors, echoing 
his forlorn image endlessly, suggesting that while there might have been just two Kane’s 
for Thatcher, there are an infinite number, all reflected through different mirrors or 
narratives (Figure 24). These tactics certainly displays Welles’ “smugness about his 
cleverness,” and are overt enough that the viewer cannot help by notice the 
“inventiveness, artifice, and playfulness” of the film’s meaning (Simmons 142).  
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Figure 23: Citizen Kane. Kane explains to Thatcher that he is “talking to two people,” vocally 
initiating the trope of multiplicity within the narrative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Citizen Kane. The trope of multiplicity is expanded with each new narrative. 
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This is one place in the film where the audience need not work to extract meaning from a 
sequence; these visual cues stylistically and bluntly indicate that whatever narrative has 
been presented is only one of many: there is no single understanding of Kane. Further, 
while these tactics are commonplace in contemporary cinema, they were yet another 
inventive and original critique of the validity of filmic narrative.  
 Finally, the contrived conclusion of Citizen Kane remains its largest critique of 
conventional cinema. Given that neither any single narrative nor any combination of 
narratives can provide a satisfactory explanation of Kane, the MacGuffin propelling the 
plot forward, the identity of Rosebud, is the audience’s last resort. Importantly, this 
answer is given beyond any inner-narrative frame, though the “privileged, omniscient” 
perspective of the concluding shot (Fabe 83). The answer to the question of identity of 
Rosebud is given to us as Bazin’s objectif, outside the frame of any subjective narrative, 
directly from Welles himself. This final shot is presented as the only agent capable of 
selecting from out of the chaotic remnants of Kane’s life (Figure 25) the single object 
which can explain his deepest desires and wishes: a sled from childhood. It is with 
unrivaled authority that the camera, and the camera alone, is able to show us what the 
driving force behind Kane’s obsession with power and money has been all along, 
represented in a single sled.  
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Figure 25: Citizen Kane. Dir. Orson Welles. 1941. Warner Home Video, 2001. DVD. An infinite 
array of possibilities for meaning, from which the camera identifies one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Citizen Kane. Dir. Orson Welles. 1941. Warner Home Video, 2001. DVD.  
The camera objectively presents us with truth, arbitrary though it may be. 
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This reading allows us to see the vision of cinema Bazin argues we wish it to have, that 
of “a recreation of the artist or the irreversibility of time” (Bazin 21). In this case, Welles 
has managed to allow the camera to recreate Kane in his own image, unburdened by the 
freedom of narrative interpretation or the alteration of memory. We can thus read the 
final shot as being the only true or objective shot in the entire film, the continuation of 
the project of Kane’s life with the greatest faith to the original project, and thus the 
greatest authority. Though the sled itself, like Kane, is lost to us behind the forbidding 
gates of Xanadu, the ever-penetrating lens of the camera that records the world around 
us without intent or alteration preserves the image of it (Figure 26). 
 For the passive viewer, the film has concluded and the answer is secured. The 
viewer can leave satisfied with the knowledge that Rosebud is a sled, possessed now 
with “a sense of closure for a narrative generated upon epistemological concepts of 
incompleteness” (Carlson 919). For the viewer wishing to engage more deeply, this final 
shot, above declared the height of realism, is itself trapped within the subjective, tainted 
by the “interpretation of the artist” – Welles himself (Bazin 21). The decision to identify 
the sled as Rosebud is, at base, “little more than a vague, sentimental light upon [Kane’s] 
character,” nothing more (“Citizen Kane” Times). As such, the film leaves viewers with 
the opportunity to question the truth within film itself, and leave feeling unsatisfied – 
either desirous of a tidier or approved analysis, or an ability to forget the realization that 
all narratives, not just this one, are fabricated. The deepest questions posed by Citizen 
Kane are not about identity, narrative structure, or innovation in cinematography; the 
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film is a serious and concerted evaluation of whether film can be truthful, or whether it is 
always, per A Star is Born, “for amusement only” (Figure 27).  
 In this way, Citizen Kane’s critique would find a welcome home amongst the 
postmodern films devoted to this same question. Spike Jonze’s Adaptation (2002) offers 
a similarly arbitrary conclusion, albeit with much more flippancy. In his attempt to 
transform Susan Orlean’s book The Orchid Thief (1998) into a successful screenplay, 
Charlie Kaufman (Nicolas Cage) becomes so overwhelmed with the task of making truth 
entertaining that the end of the film devolves into a story involving car chases, forbidden 
love, and drug trafficking. The film deviates so strongly from the original real world 
book that it cannot be read as anything other than a questioning of the ability of film to 
portray truth on screen. Certainly, this is the reading offered by Vartan Messier when he 
argues that Adaptation “is a film constructed as a series of fragmentary scenes that 
interweaves the arch-narrative of Kaufman’s struggle with repeated visualizations of his 
various screenplay attempts, self-reflexive snapshots revealing his own insecurities as a 
writer and an individual, and meta-commentaries on the writing process” (Messier 66). 
Though Messier’s argument makes important connections between the interaction of 
author and text, Adaptation in the context of this project serves to lay bare the entire 
device of crafting a project for the screen – including the sensational results when an 
effort at serious translation from book to screen is abandoned.
25
 Adaptation, like Citizen 
Kane, shows the audience the cutting room floor, the trickery behind the scenes, and 
film’s ability to mislead the unwary viewer into realms of, respectively, fantasy and 
falsity. 
  
 94 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27: A Star is Born. Dir. William A. Wellman. 1937. Kino, 2012. DVD.  
Norman Maine’s epigraph, but also a question under consideration by the film industry as a 
whole. 
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Christopher Nolan’s Inception  (2010) continues this line of meta-questioning. 
As the audience watches Cobb’s totem spin in the concluding scene – a device designed 
to allow him to differentiate between dreams and reality – the question of whether Cobb 
is awake or dreaming, and thus, whether the film ends with truth or a lie, becomes a 
painfully sustained moment that is never resolved.
26
 The film simply ends, without 
offering any answer to the micro question of Cobb’s success, or the meta-question of 
film’s ability to express truth or differentiate between reality and fabrication. Like each 
of the films considered in this chapter, Inception remains an open text, a film that offers 
a multitude of perspectives for the viewer. Some interpretations offer easy answers, yet 
the more important interpretation continues to ask whether and to what extent film can 
express truth, meaning, or reality. 
It is my contention that the very act of raising this question elevates each of the 
films here beyond the level of entertainment, of amusement only, into the level of art – 
an art that challenges its own conventions, as well as its role as a critical, political, and 
sociological medium. In this way, these films both offer us an opportunity to enter into 
the space for engagement and respond to the écriture offered by the film. Though they 
may not be the esoteric art house films Adorno imagined in “Transparencies,” they 
certainly rise to the level of art by offering the willing audience an opportunity to 
critically engage with questions imperative to the continued development and perfection 
of the medium. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
     
18
 To fully review the notable exceptions included in this chapter, see James Shokoff, 
“A Kockenlocker by Any Other Word: The Democratic Comedy of Preston Sturges,” 
Lawrence Levine, “The Folklore of Industrial Society: Popular Culture and Its 
Audience,” and Kathleen Moran and Michael Rogin, “‘What’s the Matter with Capra?’: 
Sullivan’s Travels and the Popular Front.”  
     
19
 All dialogue quoted from this film are subtitles from the DVD. Sullivan’s Travels. 
Dir. Preston Sturges. 1941. Criterion Collection, 2001. DVD 
     
20
 All dialogue quoted from this film are subtitles from the DVD. Fargo. Dir.The 
Coen Brothers. 1996. Metro Goldwyn Mayer, 2005. DVD 
     
21
 All dialogue quoted from this film are subtitles from the DVD. Burn After Reading. 
Dir. The Coen Brothers. 2008. Universal Studios Home Entertainment, 2008. DVD. 
     
22
 All dialogue quoted from this film are subtitles from the DVD. A Star is Born. Dir. 
William A. Wellman, 1937. Kino, 2012. DVD 
     
23
 Lawrence Levine is referencing Umberto Eco’s idea of an “open text,” one that 
invites viewers to interpret the text according to their own experience, understanding, 
and need. 
     
24
 All dialogue quoted from this film are subtitles from the DVD. Citizen Kane. Dir. 
Orson Welles. 1941. Warner Home Video, 2001. DVD. 
     
25
 For a superb reading of the question of authorship in Adaptation, see Vartan 
Messier’s “Desire and the ‘Deconstructionist’: Adaptation As Writerly Praxis.” 
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26
 For a full discussion of the ambiguous ending of Inception, see Mark Fisher, “The 
Lost Unconscious: Delusions and Dreams in Inception.” 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
 
The theoretical considerations, pedagogical demands, and filmic demonstrations 
in this thesis all serve to address an often considered but still incomplete discussion in 
the study of theory of literature and cinema: the treatment of literature and cinema as 
serious, important, and capable of not simply being entertaining, but enlightening for 
those who interact with it. From the perspective of the academic world as a whole, this 
problem has been addressed and resolved numerous times – we might best mark these 
resolutions by the establishment of subdisciplines within the overall canopy of literature 
studies. Poetry struggled out from under the thumb of Plato and now flourishes in 
literature departments. The struggle for the acceptance of the novel, as discussed in 
Chapter II, is so distant to today’s students that they must be taught about a time before 
it was considered standard college curriculum. Film, too, has flourished as a discipline 
and continues to receive the ample attention of scholars entirely devoted to its study. 
 True, each of these aforementioned arts enjoys a thriving discussion on the 
boundary between high art and popular culture. As Lawrence Levine notes, “scholars are 
members of a society in which popular culture is – and has been for some time – 
regularly distrusted and denigrated” (Levine 1371). Despite this initial distrust, over time 
The Line becomes myriad lines, each delineating areas of scholarship opened to 
accommodate the latest innovation from popular culture. This is, of course, a very 
complex debate involving economic disparity, cultural hegemony, and technologies of 
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power – a debate that remains to be solved by the scholars residing in those particular 
trenches.  
What is at stake here is the fact that our perception of film as a medium becomes 
strongly colored by the generic, stylistic, and formal classifications placed upon it by 
scholars. Films classified as classical, realist, serious, or screwball become branded as 
only films of those categories. Their classification calcifies around them, sometimes 
preventing any other reading from penetrating the scholarly considerations surrounding 
it. Often, the new reading becomes an additional classification for the film: Sullivan’s 
Travels becomes screwball and a critique of the Populist Front. Rarely, though, do film 
scholars take a moment to step back and consider the way in which film as a medium has 
been consistently challenging the categories placed on it by scholars, audiences, and 
often even itself. As this thesis has argued, one of the most important scholarly 
classifications that has been overlooked is that film, whatever type, is critical – critical 
about itself, the industry that produces it, and the audience that consumes it. 
Vonnegut, in one of his more pessimistic moments, grants us a diagnosis of the 
uselessness of art, if it is not considered from the proper angle: 
[Artists] use frauds in order to make human being seem more wonderful than 
they really are. Dancers show us human beings who move much more gracefully 
than human beings really move. Films and books and plays show us people 
talking much more entertainingly than people really talk, make paltry human 
enterprises seem important. Singers and musicians show us human beings 
making sounds far more lovely than human beings really make. Architects give 
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us temples in which something marvelous is obviously going on. Actually, 
practically nothing is going on inside. (Vonnegut, 164-165) 
I agree with Vonnegut that films “make paltry human enterprises seem important.” As 
works of art, that is their purpose: to find what is essential in the mundane and elevate it 
for consideration. If we accept this elevation as an invitation, then the wonder, grace, 
entertainment, love, and marvel of life become “what is going on inside” in an 
existential sense. Vonnegut here is not wallowing in pessimism; he is inviting us to view 
art as a way for these “human beings,” everyday people, to connect to their culture, their 
ideas, their problems, and their dreams. It is only when art becomes something to be 
relegated to the scrutiny of scholars, something to be seen but not touched, watched but 
not lived, that it leaves us feeling empty. 
This thesis approaches the problem from a theoretical, pedagogical, and formal 
perspective. It argues that films can and do invite viewers to engage intellectually, 
socially, politically, and philosophically. It demonstrates through careful readings of 
numerous films that the filmic apparatus is uniquely capable of drawing attention to its 
own operations, limitations, and capabilities. Most importantly, it argues that in the 
contemporary world, the act of viewing a film constitutes a rare opportunity to engage in 
an act of existential reflection: a moment to consider serious social, political, ethical, and 
intellectual issues without drowning under their weight. Given the concerns regarding 
anti-intellectualism and the declining interest in film studies discussed in this work, this 
final claim demands that further and deeper attention be paid to the existential 
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possibilities of film. The reinvigoration of interest in viewing films as critical, socially 
conscious, and philosophically powerful is not simply a suggestion – it is a mandate.  
As this thesis has argued, film has reached out to viewers consistently and 
unpretentiously from the classical period to the postmodern period. In the interests of the 
academic world, this thesis employs films that have received a fair amount of attention 
from scholars. In the interests of reaching the largest audience, these films are also 
popular and successful. Existential philosophers and critical theorists are employed 
because they are interested first and foremost in the experience of the common person, 
the shared existence of the masses, the “human being” to which Vonnegut refers. These 
philosophical considerations form the theoretical groundwork for viewing film as 
uniquely suited to reaching these individuals in a time when the culture industry as a 
whole wishes to simply placate them. 
 While this thesis offers a unique and important contribution to the considerations 
literary and film scholars have offered before, as with most theoretical works, it raises as 
many questions as it resolves. Given the importance and relevance of the topic under 
consideration, these questions serve as a point of departure for additional research into 
the nature, reception, and scholarly status of film as a medium.  
One of these questions concerns the ontological nature of the filmic image. In 
Chapter II, this thesis offers a consideration of three theoretical perspectives of the filmic 
image – realist, romantic, and idealist – and the inadequacies in filmic analysis resulting 
from use of these perspectives. Exploring other – often hidden – perceptions of the 
filmic image would expose the theoretical underpinnings of the various approaches to 
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cinema and allow scholars to open up more productive lines of discourse. For example, 
in Chapter III, it is demonstrated that Postman is working from an inadequate 
understanding of the filmic image: he incorrectly assumes it to be only capable of 
expressing particularities in a fragmented and dissociative manner. Resituating his 
argument around a conception of the image as capable of presenting abstract concepts in 
a complete and approachable manner allows us to consider his argument in an entirely 
different, and far more productive, light. Many other such misconceptions are lurking in 
film scholarship, and the field would benefit from critical and sustained consideration 
into resituating these arguments towards more productive readings. 
 Another important question concerns the existential component of the project. 
The Benjaminian analysis in this thesis restricts itself to the dialectic posed in “The 
Work of Art in the Age of Its Mechanical Reproduction” largely as a result of the size 
and scope of the project. Expanding the research into The Arcades Project, 
Illuminations, and further study of Miriam Hansen’s efforts to expand Walter 
Benjamin’s thought would enable a deeper and stronger theoretical base for the main 
claims of the work completed here. Further, fruitful discussions might be gained by 
connecting Benjamin’s discussion of the aura to Martin Heidegger’s considerations of 
the nature of the work of art. Given that Heidegger was able to more fully address the 
problem of technologically reproduced works of art in his lifetime, his considerations 
about technology can help augment and anchor Benjamin’s own, often conflicted, 
considerations about film. Additionally, these explorations would be strengthened by 
further consideration of the necessary counterpart to film: the viewer. There is ample 
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scholarly work that explores the relationship between the film and the viewer, especially 
in relation to the author/reader distinction raised by both Roland Barthes and Michel 
Foucault. Resituating these structuralist and post-structuralist considerations in relation 
to the existential framework laid out in this work will enable scholars to establish a 
relationship that empowers both the film and the viewer as agents working both in and 
against an overarching economic and cultural framework. 
 Finally, further discussions of film from the perspective I have laid out in this 
thesis are necessary. It is crucial to continue identifying and discussing films that 
demonstrate self-conscious awareness of their own operation within the filmic medium, 
especially when it comes to raising and discussing matters of social, intellectual, and 
philosophical importance. While this thesis restricts itself to two primary films, 
Sullivan’s Travels and Citizen Kane, scholars ought to continue to explore films from the 
classical, postmodern and contemporary periods that exhibit elements of complicitous 
critique. As scholarly literature grows on the topic of films self-aware of their own 
capability to continually challenge and expand film as a medium, the claim that film is 
first and foremost critical will become increasingly evident to scholars and viewers alike. 
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